The lose-lose armed conflict

The battles for Mariupol and Debaltsevo will play a vital role in the outcome of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. A separatist victory in the former will result in the gain of the Donetsk region’s second-largest city and the main port on the Azov Sea. A victory in the latter adds a strategic pocket of territory which would allow for the consolidation of the borders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics into a common frontline.

A Ukrainian victory on the other hand, while stopping the advancement of separatist forces, will more than likely just solidify the post-Soviet area’s latest, and most severe, frozen conflict.

The main question now is what happens next? It is impossible for Ukraine to win the war on its own while it is equally impossible for it to capitulate. In this case a victory is not to lose more territory than it has already lost.

It is also impossible for Russia to win the war without provoking a much wider conflict and facing much tougher repercussions than sanctions.

The US military involvement is starting to appear more likely, especially after the newly-appointed Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said last week that he was “very much inclined”  to send anti-tank missiles, small arms, and ammunition to Ukraine.

The US participation would increase regional tension, intensify fighting, and not even make a Ukrainian military victory more likely, due in part to the limited quantity and defensive nature of the weapons in question.

Washington knows it cannot confront Russia full on, just as Moscow knows it cannot do the same to Kiev, so a stalemate continues to save everyone’s face.

A non-military solution is the only feasible way of resolving the situation in eastern Ukraine without Europe descending into another prolonged Bosnia-type bloodbath. If indeed all sides decide that violence is not the answer, there are four possible scenarios for the resolution of the conflict.

Future scenarios

The first scenario is that Donbass is annexed to the Russian Federation. Taking on Donbass even in its pre-war state would require huge investment to update its mining and steel sectors. However, now the region also needs to be rebuilt after the war damage. Throw in a militarily indefensible border, competition between Donbass and Russia’s own Ural industries, and extreme international isolation, and this outcome appears to be too costly.

Russia would also retain very little influence over the future Ukraine, something that is more appealing to the Kremlin than gaining territory.

The second scenario is that Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics join forces and become another post-Soviet de-facto state like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Transnistria. With both Moscow and Kiev unable or unwilling to integrate Donbass into their respective states, the region will become another self-declared, yet unrecognized, state. This would only be feasible if Russia foots the entire bill for reconstruction, defense, and basically the region’s very existence.

In the third scenario the entire Donbass region is reintegrated into Ukraine. Beyond the costs necessary for returning Donbass to a functioning condition, Kiev would also have to regain the trust of local citizens. At the very least some sort of regional autonomy would have to be put on the table, if not full federalization.

In essence, this would just mean conceding to the demands put forth by the former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions over the last decade or so, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recently proposed peace plan. This appears as the most likely of the three scenarios.

Keeping Donbass a part of a federalized Ukraine would create a new Crimea – a legally autonomous bastion of continued Russian support – while preserving a unitary Ukrainian state.

A possible peace deal involving aspects of federalization, autonomy, Russian language and cultural rights, and NATO was recently discussed between Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Francois Hollande.

The main points revolved around just how much power the regions should have at the expense of the central government, and whether Ukraine will pursue NATO membership or remain non-aligned. It goes without saying that Ukraine and Russia stand at the opposite polls with the EU somewhere closer to the Ukrainian side.

In the final scenario no settlement is reached beyond a ceasefire and the conflict remains frozen for the foreseeable future. Currently, Donbass is similar to South Ossetia before the 2008 Russia-Georgia war: not really a part of Russia, not really independent, and not really a part of Georgia (in this case Ukraine) though maintaining some aspects of all three.

A full military settlement is unlikely as no side is willing to use the amount of violence necessary to produce a total victory. War will cease, but peace will not take its place.

If none of these scenarios take place and the violence continues long enough, both the Ukrainian and the Russian society can polarize into two camps: those who are sick of war and death and want an end to the fighting, and those who want to continue the fight no matter what. This in turn can lead to renewed domestic political crises in both countries furthering the sources of internal and regional conflict.

Ukraine’s wildly diverse ruling parliamentary coalition is already appearing shaky as a solution to the war in Donbass remains out of reach. Additionally, President Poroshenko continues to appoint his own people to high positions leading some to believe that the Euromaidan protests simply replaced one set of oligarchs with another.

As the Russian economy continues to worsen it remains to be seen how much the Russian people will tolerate before they demand a return to the pre-conflict living standards. Hit by sanctions and a falling Ruble, the euphoria over gaining Crimea is wearing thin as prices for consumer goods continue to rise. However, the country’s weak and disjointed opposition must place its hopes on someone a lot better than Aleksei Navalny if it wants to seriously challenge President Putin.

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According to recent polls from Rating Sociological Group carried out from April 25-30, the leading candidates among voters who plan to participate in the May 25 elections are Petro Poroshenko (43.4%) and Yulia Tymoshenko (13.9%), both from the so-called pro-European opposition. Taking third place is actually the “hard to determine” category (12.0%) with fourth Sergei Tigipko (6.7%) the highest ranked of the pro-Russia candidates. Voter turnout is predicted to be 64% and almost a third of residents in the Donbass and southern regions do not plan to vote.

With the two leading candidates both representing pro-European sentiments, many in eastern and southern regions see no point in voting for politicians who don’t listen to their opinions. This has also been emphasized in certain circles as a basis for secession or federalization. More telling, however, is the fact that not one single pro-Russia politician has a mass base of support in eastern and southern regions, not even enough to get double digit poll rating and make it to the second round.

Additionally, Russia’s annexation of Crimea took away one of its strongest bastions of support inside Ukraine. Seeing as the majority of Ukrainians in the east and south do not wish to secede, this shows rather their loss of belief in the current Ukrainian political system and not a desire to join Russia.

This leaves the likely scenario of a second round of elections held in June between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko. Contrary to perceptions in the West these two candidates, as well as the current interim Kiev government, represent not a fresh start, but rather a recycled version of the government in power during the presidency of Viktor Yuschenko.

Poroshenko, who was Yuschenko’s largest backer, and Tymoshenko became bitter enemies while he was secretary of the National Security and Defense Council and she was Prime Minister. It was also during this time that Tymoshenko nearly formed a parliamentary coalition with the Party of Regions. From this perspective Poroshenko represents a return of the Orange order which was highly unpopular in eastern and southern regions, as well as in Russia.

Considering Tymoshenko’s proven ability to work with Russian President Vladimir Putin combined with her personal strength, charisma, and pragmatism, it is highly likely that she will play a significant role in the future of Ukraine. Indeed her very refusal to withdraw from the presidential elections is seemingly preventing Poroshenko from winning the first round outright.

This situation presents two possible outcomes: either Tymoshenko will look to the east and south (and Russia) for support in the second round as the unifier and savior of the country or else throw in the towel and try to keep her people in power until she can become prime minister.

In the first case, being a native Russian speaker from Dnepropetrovsk could appeal to some eastern and southern voters. Her rise to power in business and politics during pro-Russia regimes and her involvement in the gas industry provides links to the status-quo order that would appear favorable to Russia. She would also be acceptable to the West. As she was in prison until the very end, she could also distance herself from the chaos of Euromaidan despite the fact that members of her party are the current acting president and prime minister. Her rapid transformation to Ukrainian nationalist during the time of the Orange Revolution could be undone just as easily.

In the second case, the presidential elections will be a write off as real power could soon rest with the prime minster. While all the attention has been focused on Russia and the so called anti-terrorist operation in the Donetsk region, the Verkhovna Rada has just sent its plan for amending the constitution to the Venice Commission. According to Ukrainian journalist Vitaliy Sych, the plan contains amendments similar to those passed in 2006 which increase the powers of the prime minister at the expense of the president.

Additionally, Sych states that the document lists 2017 as the date for parliamentary elections, meaning the parliament elected in 2012 will get to serve its full mandate. With members of Tymoshenko’s Batkivschyna party currently holding important government posts and the party in the majority coalition in the Verkhovna Rada, Tymoshenko would already be in a position of power.

As the media continues to focus on the admittedly vivid imagery of the conflict, attention is deflected from the core issues. Elites on all sides have been able to stir up nationalist sentiments creating a situation of Maidan vs. Anti-Maidan, fascists vs. anti-fascists, western Ukraine vs. eastern Ukraine, the West vs. Russia, and Europe vs. Eurasia, meanwhile the same old politicians are using the same old tricks to divvy up the spoils. The depiction of Russia as the most serious threat has resulted in Ukrainians supporting yet another government with only its own interests at heart. This could result in the return of both Tymoshenko and a pro-Russia regime.

Moscow has no need or desire for a full-scale military conflict, a civil war on its borders, or the absorption of poor provincial regions all of which would strain its struggling economy even further. An outright annexation of eastern Ukraine would only move problems a few hundred kilometers further west while removing most of the remaining Russian support from the country. Much more useful is an independent, yet totally compliant, neighbor who remains a key component in Russia’s political and economic plans.

Article image: jorono / Pixabay

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First Crimea, then…?

Russia’s unexpected annexation of Crimea from Ukraine has sparked fears that it is only a matter of time before Russian President Vladimir Putin makes another land grab. Various hysterical sources have pondered at the Russian annexation of the Baltic States, Poland, Finland, and even Alaska, in addition to several regions of eastern Ukraine. This is all very unlikely as Crimea was a unique case with a pre-existing structure in place and several loopholes Russia could exploit.

First, Crimea was the most pro-Russian of Ukrainian regions so the majority of locals were not going to make much of a fuss. Second, Crimea, as an autonomous region, has its own governmental structures in place making it rather easy to set up a new administration. Legally or not, Crimea had the capability to hold a referendum and use its parliament to pass laws and there was nothing Kiev could do to stop this.

Third, most of the Russian troops and military hardware was already in Crimea. Under the terms of the agreement on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, Russia had the right to keep up to 25,000 troops in its handful of bases, along with a specified amount of weapons and vehicles. Violations arose when Russian troops left their bases without the consent of the Ukrainian president. However, Moscow doesn’t recognize the legitimacy of the new Kiev government and the former President Viktor Yanukovych, whom the Kremlin still considers the legal head of state, was not opposed to the troop deployment. Again, while this was technically illegal, what could Kiev do to oppose?

Therefore, we must consider the possibility that this is not some renewed act of Russian expansionism but rather an action, albeit a drastic one, taken to punish the new Kiev government that wants to remove Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence. While getting involved in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, President Putin limited his actions to those he knew he could get away with. A full scale invasion of eastern Ukraine with tanks rolling across the border would carry far greater repercussions and would provoke a much more condemning response. Additionally, in strategic terms the Crimean peninsula’s two entry points from mainland Ukraine are much easier to guard than the thousands of kilometers along the borders of the country’s eastern regions.

Armed Groups Demonstrate Overall Lack of Control

Three recent actions by the far-right group Pravy Sektor (Right Sector) have added to its continued marginalization on the domestic scene. These include the controversial death of its leader in Western Ukraine, Oleksandr Muzychko, after an alleged firefight with police, the attempted storming of the Ukranian Parliament by a segment of its members, and a shooting on Kiev’s main street involving members of the Sektor and Maidan self-defense units that left three people injured. Maidan self-defense members then blockaded the Parliament the day after Pravy Sektor’s attempted incursion, an act they repeated in various locations over the past months to stop “provocations”. Added to the pile are the hired thugs known as titushki who support the former regime. Operating outside the existing legal structures, none of these groups are held responsible by any state authority.

The main problem for Ukraine is not the far-right nature of Pravy Sektor, they have far too few members and far too little influence in politics to make a difference, or the rag-tag composition of the self-defense groups wearing army surplus fatigues and carrying homemade weapons. It is the fact that the very presence of armed paramilitary-like groups on the streets of Kiev, occupying city buildings, hotels, squares and parks, expose the Ukrainian government’s complete lack of control even of its own surroundings. As the fighting between various groups in eastern Ukraine goes on and many western and central regions have already got their administrations overrun by protesters during the Euromaidan events, the Kiev government badly needs to stabilize the internal security situation in order to be able to stake its claim for legitimacy.

Inclusive or Exclusive? Eastern and Southern Regions in the New Order

Despite statements by acting President Alexander Turchinov and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk that Ukraine is indivisible and territorial integrity will be maintained, the actions of its leaders do not offer the same support. From the attempted cancellation of the regional language law to the appointment of only three ministers from Eastern and Southern regions to the new government, and to calls for the exclusion of the Party of Regions and Communist Party, the perception is that the predominantly Russian speaking Eastern and South regions are being marginalized.

Among other issues, this has given rise to renewed calls for the federalization of the country and even for the holding of regional referendums similar to Crimea’s. While at this moment in time federalization would open the Pandora’s box (not just for the Eastern regions concerning their relations with Russia but also for Western and Central ones where many feel that Kiev is not living up to the demands of Euromaidan), the right to elect regional governors instead of having them appointed by the President could be a compromise solution. If Ukraine is to stick together, any new government must highlight what brings Ukrainians together, instead of only focusing on what keeps them apart.

And the Loser Is… the Ukrainian People

With oligarch Petro Poroshenko the favorite to win the May 25 presidential elections, UDAR’s Vitali Klitschko has dropped out of the race and offered his support for the “chocolateking,” the nickname Poroshenko got for his ownership of Ukraine’s largest confectionary manufacturer. This can lead to two possible scenarios. First, Yulia Tymoshenko can also drop out of the race thereby unifying the opposition behind one solid candidate. Second and the more likely of the two, Tymoshenko will fight tooth and nail to get herself elected resulting in her pandering for support wherever she can find it. In turn, this could lead to her either siding with people close to the former government, or dividing the electorate so badly that either Sergei Tigipko or Mikhail Dobkin from Party of Regions can sneak in and snatch victory.

Furthermore, this situation is a rerun of the Orange period when Poroshenko was an ardent supporter of then-President Yuschenko who experienced constant power struggles with then-Prime Minister Tymoshenko. This means that even in the post-Euromaidan environment, after months of protests, the death of at least hundred people, and the loss of Crimea, Ukrainians are not presented with any new faces or ideas. On the one hand there is the possibility of a return to the Orange order, a period of bickering and political stalemate which resulted in the subsequent election of Party of Regions’ Yanukovych to the presidency in 2010. On the other, there is the unthinkable return of the Party of Regions to power just months after Yanukovych was expelled from office after violent events on and around Kiev’s Independence Square.

With a devaluating currency, rising prices, powerful neighbors, regional divides, and lack of internal security, Ukraine needs a better alternative than a return of the governments that put the country in its current position in the first place.

Article image: jorono / Pixabay

Julkaisu Local Factors in the Ukrainian Political Conundrum ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

Ukraine has been thrown into an extremely precarious situation after three months of protests (Euromaidan) which culminated in violence and up to 100 deaths, the impeachment of President Viktor Yanukovych, the disintegration of his government, the forming of a new temporary government, the announcement of presidential elections to be held on 25 May, and the release of jailed ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

Truly unprecedented scenes of violence and political change took place in Kiev within a matter of a few days, leaving little time to make sense of it all. What at first sight seems like a triumph of the people over a corrupt government might just be a Ukrainian Trojan horse allowing for the reentry of discredited and bitter politicians, including Tymoshenko herself, to the political arena.

Ukraine faces three immediate and rather serious issues. First, it needs to have a functional government. The political infighting and jockeying for power that is already occurring needs to be adequately subdued in order to provide the country with functioning state organs and institutions. By the looks of the proposed candidates though, it seems that it will be a choice between politicians from the Yuschenko era, or popular personages from Euromaidan (meaning literally “Eurosquare” in Ukrainian) with no real political experience. Second, the economy desperately needs to be stabilized. With the Ukrainian Gryvna falling daily against the Dollar and the Euro there is a real chance of another economic crisis like the one in 2008 when the Gryvna/Dollar ratio fell from less than 5:1 to nearly 10:1 before stabilizing at 8:1. The rate is currently more than 9:1.

Third, the central government needs to find a way to (re)integrate the regions. Euromaidan protests of various sizes broke out all around the country where many local and regional administrations, police stations, and military bases in western and central areas falling into the hands of the protesters. Conversely, now that Yanukovych has been removed, eastern and southern regions refuse to recognize the current temporary government and there is a fear that Crimea might go to Russia, either willingly or forcefully. What Ukraine needs is a non-polarizing and non-antagonistic leadership, something that seemed unlikely even before Tymoshenko was released from prison.

Tymoshenko is a very divisive figure within Ukrainian politics. She amassed her fortunes in the natural gas business during the 1990s in her native Dnepropetrovsk on the back of then-regional governor and later Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko (who later was sentenced to nine years in US Federal prison for money laundering). After changing sides numerous times she ended up with Viktor Yuschenko and took part in the Orange Revolution in 2004, passing herself off as a Ukrainian-speaking nationalist with the help of language tutors and an image consultant. Even if many Ukrainians do not know or remember these events, most of them surely remember her time as the Prime Minister. Her bitter quarrels and tugs of war with President Yuschenko brought the government to a standstill and played a large role later in her losing the 2010 presidential elections to Yanukovych. While the actual charges brought against Tymoshenko as well as the timing of her imprisonment may have been intended as an act of political revenge, many Ukrainians felt she deserved to be in jail. Consequently, through its vocal support of Tymoshenko the West has legitimized a politician who has discredited herself on numerous occasions in the eyes of many Ukrainians, not least when she turned up on the Maidan stage in a wheelchair, began crying theatrically, and immediately placed herself at the front of a struggle she played no physical role in.

Despite being one of the main demands of Euromaidan, new elections might not determine very much. Elections in Ukraine are more about which group gets the power and access to state resources than which political party will do the most to improve the country. On the one hand Yanukovych and his government are gone, something the majority of Ukrainians are happy about. The problem now is Tymoshenko, who announced her intention to run for presidency. Will so many voters be turned off by her that they are willing to vote for someone like Sergey Tigipko representing Party of Regions? Such a turnaround happened in 2010 when Ukrainians willingly elected Yanukovych, the man they came to the streets to prevent from taking power in 2004.

Then there is Vitaliy Klitschko, notable for his near disappearance since the end of the violence. As the most active leader of the opposition troika, he gained certain respect despite the fact he is not an experienced politician. Much also depends on the reinstatement of the 2004 constitutional amendments and new parliamentary elections. As the parliament is strengthened at the expense of the presidency, the elections on 25 May will become less important in the long run. It remains to be seen if anyone can break the cycle and forge a new way forward.

A telling quote from a recent article in Ukrainskaya Pravda brings up a poignant reality when talking about the inability of any elites to replace this corrupt patronage system of relations as the Donetsk group has been replaced with ‘dear friends’ who are ‘obviously hungry and in the mood for revenge.’ Many of them are the same people who divided up the state’s resources during Tymoshenko’s previous time in office. They are no different than the Donetsk group who were just kicked out, they were ‘just better at concealing themselves, as they went around wearing vyshivanki’ (traditional Ukrainian embroidered shirts).

Patronage networks, clients, and oligarchs are features of many post-Soviet political systems. In Ukraine, however, certain groups have managed to adopt the façade of nationalism and democracy, fooling the electorate (and the West), while enriching themselves as much as possible before their eventual replacement by a rival network in the next election. This system did not originate with Yanukovych, and it looks like it will not end with him either.

Article image: jorono / Pixabay

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