Palm oil plays a significant role in the Indonesian economy. In early 2024, a controversial issue about oil palm occurred again in Indonesia. One of the chocolate producers inserted “palm oil free” label in their container, and became a target of protest by a religious farmer group Santri Tani. The protesters claimed, that labeling distributed food products palm oil free, the producer would commit state treason.

In Indonesia, food product labeled with ‘palm oil free’ is unacceptable. When such labels are found, the Ministry of Trade can ask for the products to be withdrawn from the market. The label violates the regulation of the National Agency of Drug and Food Control of Indonesia no. 20/2021 on Processed Food Label (article 67 point 2, l) which states “business actors are prohibited from including statements or information that directly or indirectly denigrate the goods and/or services of other parties.”

The article does not name specific products, and there has been only two cases affected by this regulation so far, with both products, asserting the “palm oil free” labels.

Palm oil is a complex economic issue. Indonesia and Europe have their own perspectives, mainly based on different conceptions of sustainability. Europe wants to regulate palm oil so that the EU citizens would not consume products that contribute to deforestation or forest degradation worldwide, through the EU Deforestation-Free Regulation (EUDR). Thus, it is for environmental sustainability. Meanwhile, Indonesia, the world’s biggest producer and exporter of palm oil (60%), claims the EU regulation on palm oil will impact the global food market, even food security in the future.

Palm oil is a complex economic issue. Indonesia and Europe have their own perspectives, mainly based on different conceptions of sustainability.

There are 16 million hectares of oil palm plantations in Indonesia, and 41% of these or around 7 million hectares belong to  8 million small farmers, and trade disruption would put their lives at risk. For the Indonesian authorities, palm oil is an economic opportunity, thus sustainability is about fairness, poverty eradication, and society. Such different conceptions of sustainability regarding palm oil remain in discussions between the EU and Indonesia (also Malaysia).

Indonesia had banned palm oil exports in 2022 due to the high domestic price of vegetable oil and this shocked many countries, including the farmers in Indonesia. The ban only lasted for two months, yet this shifted the paradigm of the oil palm industry in global food (and energy) security clarifying that Indonesia did not want to be dictated, especially when there was shortage of vegetable oil (sunflower oil) in Europe because of Russia-Ukraine war.

EUDR and EU perspective 

In 2023, the regulation on deforestation-free products, known as EUDR, came into force. Large companies had 18 months to prepare (with an additional 6 months for small enterprises). EUDR is designed to regulate products consumed by the EU citizens so as not to contribute to deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and biodiversity loss.

EU enacted the regulation that commodities representing the largest share of deforestation, such as palm oil (33.95%), soy (32.83%), wood (8.62%), cocoa (7.54%), coffee (7.01%) and beef (5.01%) must certify their products for having deforestation-free land. Specifically for palm oil, the certification must come from the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).

Through EUDR, EU aspires to a global environmental leadership role in addressing ecological and social concerns associated with trade-driven tropical deforestation and forest degradation. However call for a revision of this regulation came also from the EU members and their local farmers because the administrative tasks, such as “due diligence, traceability, and certification”, would burden farmers. The same requirement would definitely burden smallholders, indigenous peoples, and local communities in producer countries outside the EU.

Through EUDR, EU aspires to a global environmental leadership role in addressing ecological and social concerns associated with trade-driven tropical deforestation and forest degradation.

In the EU, products containing the label ‘palm oil free’ are common. When this label is attached to the product, it suggests the product would be ‘sustainable, environment-friendly and respect labour’. Consequently, without the label, palm oil in a product indicates something is wrong with palm oil – although the discussion between good and bad palm oil is still controversial and debatable, depending on perspectives.

Yet such a label actually only raises awareness, it is up to the consumers whether they want to buy the products or not. Therefore, while the label is acceptable in Europe, it is not in Indonesia. As the story in the beginning of this article showed, the label can trigger chaos and lead to the banning of certain products.

Palm oil is used in many daily-life products, like chocolate, biscuits, bread, cosmetics, cooking oil and furniture.  Moreover, the palm oil crop is cheap and efficient, with “one hectare of well-managed plantation estate land can produce up to 10 times more oil than other oilseed alternatives”.

Attacks and counters towards palm oil

Apart from ‘palm oil free’ label that is common in Europe, negative campaigns attacking palm oil products continue in Europe. Palm oil is considered the most controversial option for cooking oil in terms of health and environmental reasons. According to reports palm oil contains high-saturated fats but there are also many health benefits: it prevents vitamin D deficiency in many middle-income countries and protects cognitive and cardio health. Combined with the allegations of deforestation of the rainforest and risking the loss of endangered species, many producers then marked their products with the “palm-oil free” label.

Apart from having a dialogue with the policymakers in the EU on environment protection, Indonesia also tried to counter, or limit the general negative campaigning against palm oil related to health and environmental issues. Indonesia published a book The Myths and Facts of Indonesia’s Palm Oil Industry (the latest edition was in 2023) prepared by the Palm Oil Agribusiness Strategic Policy Institute.

Palm oil is considered the most controversial option for cooking oil in terms of health and environmental reasons.

The content countered the argument of climate impacts – such as biodiversity loss and deforestation – on health, and social impacts – such as corruption, land-grabbing, and forced or child labor. The book is used by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its embassies to tackle negative campaigns against oil palm, notably in Europe. This book is available only in English, used mainly by diplomats and clearly intended for international readers. According to our interviewed source, not many academics nor community organizations in Indonesia knew about its existence.

Another counter effort was to advertise public services the palm oil company provides for the remote areas, such as providing public transports, schools, health centers and daycare facilities.

Perspectives from Indonesia

Although EUDR also affects coffee and cocoa, Indonesia thinks that the EU’s regulation is “moral finger-wagging” specifically for its palm oil products. According to Indonesian resources (around 30 stakeholders being interviewed from government, media, non-government organizations both local and international agencies, associations, and academicians), the EU’s pressure started in 2016 with the RED II policy or Renewable Energy Directive 2018. Later, with the EUDR, Indonesia assumed that the EU tried to protect its local farmers cultivating soybean, rapeseed, flowers, and olive oil from the import of palm oil, and called it protectionism.

Interviews revealed that EUDR has become another tool to regulate palm oil due to its potential in biodiesel production, which is important for sustainable energy transition while maintaining energy security. Dialogues and negotiations between the EU and Indonesia (and Malaysia) have been ongoing through diplomacy and Joint Task Force on EUDR since May 2023. Planning to work closely on efforts on deforestation in the third meeting in October 2024, EU Commission proposed to postpone the EUDR application by one year to the end of 2025.

As our research on good and bad palm oil started, we came to Indonesia during summer of 2024 and heard the perspectives of many stakeholders. We met people from different institutions: government, companies, NGO’s, media, associations including certification-organization like RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) and ISPO (Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil), academicians, and even international agencies whose work is related to palm oil.

These stakeholders in the palm oil industry interact with various others, for example, one agency represents many interests, such as farmers and members of the association or a government worker, but also owning a small oil palm plantation. Thus each stakeholder has different interests regarding the commodity’s impacts.

Palm oil industry in Indonesia has been organized by at least 30 ministries, including local government institutions, with different aspects and scopes to regulate.

Their narratives show different power dynamics and negotiations to pursue their interests. Yet, government policies, their implementation, and supervision remain weak in areas of “deforestation, biodiversity loss, forest fires and air pollution, carbon emissions, water abstraction, including in land conflicts and Indigenous rights” –issues that are environmentally important. When it comes to sustainability, palm oil is a complex issue hindered by problems of forest opening, land certification, greedy companies, and corrupted elites. The players are also numerous and diverse from the national to the local levels.

Palm oil industry in Indonesia has been organized by at least 30 ministries, including local government institutions, with different aspects and scopes to regulate. The obvious ones would be the Ministry of Environment and Forestry with the Ministry of Agriculture. The interviews also revealed that even the Ministry of Religion was involved in handling this issue. This is a portrayal of palm oil industry magnitude in Indonesia, also for those not directly relevant to palm oil.

Yet all these stakeholders, including critical NGOs, have acknowledged the importance of palm oil for Indonesia. They just hoped the government would regulate fairly without being reckless in managing palm oil. Therefore, instead of acting as “moral finger-wagger”, it is expected that the EU could help an exporter country like Indonesia to pursue palm oil sustainability, both economically and environmentally, especially for the wider public impacted directly by palm oil. 

Through the lens of sustainability  

Both EU and Indonesia use the term ‘sustainability’ to defend their standpoint. This means ‘environmental sustainability’ for the EU and ‘economic sustainability’ for Indonesia (and Malaysia). Thus from the standpoint of the latter, EU regulations were always seen as discriminatory. A study in Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies back in 2022 stated that “both the EU and Indonesia are concerned about sustainability; however, [yet] have different perspectives and parameters to ensure environmental standards are upheld”.

EU has claimed the expansion of palm oil plantations in Indonesia has resulted in deforestation and peatland degradation. Yet, most interviewees from the government side worried that when upholding environmental issues, “people cannot afford to eat”.

The Indonesian case for sustainability still revolves around reducing poverty, leaving no one behind, and protecting smallholders, even when opening two percent of the abundant forests in Papua land for palm oil plantation. In line with the NGOs wishes, when opening palm oil plantations in Papua, the government must be able to tackle food insecurity in Papua, as well as malnutrition due to food imported from outside the region.

With different views on labeling, managing sustainability and certification, it is obvious that governing palm oil is not easy. The exporting countries, such as Indonesia, and the recipient and regulator institution, such as the EU, need to sit down together to negotiate agreeable solutions.

Indonesia is also determined to have its own sustainable palm oil certification, compared to RSPO. The Indonesian Sustainability Palm Oil (ISPO) was established by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2015 and it later expanded through the Presidential Regulation in 2020. However, the ISPO regulation was likely imposed more for upholding national sovereignty against the RSPO.  

ISPO developed by Indonesia, is – despite its compulsory nature –  limited with authority and enforcement when working for sustainable palm oil, in tackling “deforestation, biodiversity loss, greenhouse gas emissions, and social conflicts between big plantations and local communities”. It required many submitted documents and it emphasized sanctions over prevention, and guidance and sustainability actions for farmers and companies. The global market, including EU, has not acknowledged ISPO’s sustainability standards yet.

With different views on labeling, managing sustainability and certification, it is obvious that governing palm oil is not easy. The exporting countries, such as Indonesia, and the recipient and regulator institution, such as the EU, need to sit down together to negotiate agreeable solutions. Although the commitment to protecting the environment and tackling the climate crisis are important, the EUDR should be proportioned to address the multilateral agreement from the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities as the UN Climate Change Convention recommended.

Responsibility towards the environment (and tackling climate crisis) is different between low and middle-income countries such as Indonesia and high-income countries such as in the EU. Palm oil has a potential for energy security in the future, and both the EU and Indonesia must work together to achieve sustainability aspects of palm oil, both environmentally and economically.

Ratih D. Adiputri is a postdoc researcher at the Department Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, working on the project Good and bad palm oil funded by the Kone Foundation (no. 202205436).

Article image: Ratih Adiputri

Julkaisu Governing the Palm Oil Complexity ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

Özçelik, Ali Onur; Butnaru Troncotă, Miruna & Cucută, Radu-Alexandru (Eds.). Reconfiguring EU Peripheries: Political Elites, Contestation, and Geopolitical Shifts. Helsinki University Press 2024.

One of the central elements assessed in the volume is the constructed and contested nature of peripherality in connection to European Union integration. Throughout their research, the authors of the book argue that the concept of periphery is not a fixed one, but rather fluid and in constant change, encompassing issues of political, economic, and symbolic marginalization, fact which is observable in each of the case studies.

Aware of the economic underpinnings of the concept of periphery, the authors adopt a political and geopolitical meaning of the term and use this framework to examine how political elites in the studied peripheral countries perceive and engage with the EU, shaping their countries’ future trajectories in relation to the EU. Assessing peripherality as a multidimensional issue, the authors engage in defining peripheries from three main theoretical frameworks: post-structuralism, constructivism, and critical geopolitics.

The overarching research question that guides this volume is “How is the concept of ‘EU periphery’ defined by the perspectives of political elites interpreting their countries’ positions towards the EU?”. This is a timely and relevant inquiry, particularly given the multitude of systemic challenges the (peripheral) European countries had to deal with from 2010 until now, most notably the ongoing war in Ukraine, with various consequences for the integration processes.

The authors adopt a political and geopolitical meaning of the term and use this framework to examine how political elites in the studied peripheral countries perceive and engage with the EU, shaping their countries’ future trajectories in relation to the EU.

Hence, the two main objectives advanced by the authors are: First, to examine the various understandings of the EU’s interactions with its peripheries by outlining the constructed nature of ‘peripherality; and second: explore domestic political elites` attitudes towards the EU in eight relevant comparative case studies of countries at different stages of EU integration/accession processes, namely EU member states (Romania and Hungary), candidate countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Türkiye), and prospective candidates (Kosovo and Georgia).

Methodologically, the volume relies on qualitative data collection, employing semi-structured interviews with political elites in each of the eight aforementioned countries. This approach allows the researchers to capture the nuanced and often ambivalent perceptions that political leaders hold towards the EU. The choice of countries at different stages of EU integration enables a comparative analysis of how peripherality is constructed and contested across different political and economic contexts.

Accordingly, the comparative approach provides a nuanced understanding of how political elites in these countries frame their nations’ positions towards EU integration (or lack thereof) within the broader geopolitical landscape. The focus on semi-structured interviews ensures that the data collected yields rich and detailed insights, since the subjective perspectives of political elites lay at the center of the authors` argumentation.

Tying political elites’ perceptions on peripherality to the broader EU integration debate

The book entails both theoretical discussions and empirical case studies, being sectioned into three parts. The first part focuses on Hungary and Romania, two EU member states that are viewed as “inner peripheries” due to their marginal positions within EU structures.

The second chapter reveals Hungary`s increasing peripheral position due to its nationalistic foreign policy views that are rather contesting EU foreign policy and shape nationalist responses to European crises (such as the war in Ukraine).

Chapter three examines Romania`s stigmatized status as an EU “laggard” and how events like the second failed Schengen bid have influenced Romanian elites’ ambivalence towards the EU, rising frustration and Eurosceptic attitudes. The authors argue that Romania’s peripheral perceived status within the EU is rather a political and symbolic construction than an economic or geographical consequence.

The second part shifts attention to candidate countries. Hence, the forth chapter assesses Ukraine’s political elites` evolving perspectives towards the EU, particularly in light of Russia’s war of aggression, revealing the elites` attitudes towards the EU haven`t changed significantly, since Ukraine shares a strong sense of belonging to the EU space and culture, contesting the label of peripherality.

Chapter five evaluates Moldova’s evolving relationship with the EU, revealing the elites` determination towards an irreversible process of Europeanization of the country, as well as an accepted status of periphery. Chapter six analyzes political elites` attitudes towards EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, revealing that the Eurosceptic attitudes have been long constructed by the politicians who show strong apathy towards the EU, reflecting deep internal ethno-national divides.

The book overall highlights how periphery should not be viewed in geographic and economic terms, but also political and symbolic, shaped by ongoing geopolitical shifts that have either strengthened calls for “more EU” involvement or triggered disappointment over unmet expectations.

Chapter seven delves into Türkiye’s declining enthusiasm for EU integration, as Turkish elites increasingly see the EU as unreliable, shifting from conditional cooperation to a more transactional approach, especially after the migration crisis and the war in Ukraine. The chapter reveals growing perceptions of the country as a periphery.

The third part, encompassing chapters eight and nine, examines Kosovo and Georgia`s positions in relation to the EU. In chapter eight, the authors reveal the ambivalent positions of Georgian elites, who simultaneously support and oppose EU integration, being satisfied with the status of “periphery” since it allows them to adopt a series of reforms while avoiding others.

Chapter nine reveals Kosovo’s political elites` ambivalent stance, since they assume a strong commitment to EU integration, while strongly criticizing the contesting EU treatment towards the country.

As a corollary, in the final chapter, the authors draw insights from the case studies, providing a comparative analysis of the political dynamics at the EU’s periphery, analysis grounded in post-structuralist and constructivist perspectives.

The book overall highlights how periphery should not be viewed in geographic and economic terms, but also political and symbolic, shaped by ongoing geopolitical shifts that have either strengthened calls for “more EU” involvement or triggered disappointment over unmet expectations. Each chapter uses different theoretical frameworks and data, offering rich insights into the complex, non-binary understanding of peripherality across the studied countries.

Analysis and final thoughts

One of the most evident conclusions of the research is that every studied country internalizes its “periphery” status differently, aligning with the term in some cases and contesting it in other cases. It is interesting, for instance, to look at how states perceive their own peripherality based on different variables.

Ukraine, for example, doesn`t see itself as a peripheral state, but as a inherent part of Europe, due to their historical, cultural and geopolitical sharing, while accepts its peripheral status from an economic standpoint. Türkiye, on the other hand, is seen as a periphery due to its lack of democratization process and compliance to the standards of EU. Romania, in contrast, but for its alignment to EU standards and values, is self-perceived as peripheral by elites.

The volume, nevertheless, might have two main limitations, both acknowledged by the authors themselves. The first one would be the lack of female representatives among the interviewees, which can be considered one potential weakness, as it could limit the diversity of viewpoints captured in the study.

Reconfiguring EU Peripheries is a timely and important contribution to the literature on EU integration. By examining how political elites in peripheral regions view their countries’ relationships with the EU.

Moreover, employing a qualitative approach, but for the in-depts insights it provides, results might not be as easily generalizable as for a quantitative approach. At the same time, the chapters use different theoretical frameworks and data, which could, again, make drawing generalizations and direct comparisons between the countries even harder.

However, Reconfiguring EU Peripheries is a timely and important contribution to the literature on EU integration. By examining how political elites in peripheral regions view their countries’ relationships with the EU, the authors provide valuable insights into the fluid and constructed nature of peripherality, providing a nuanced perspective to the EU integration debates, challenging the conventional understanding of contestation and peripherality.

The comparative approach and rich qualitative data, as well as the choosing of the case studies and analytical rigor make it a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers interested in EU integration, geopolitics, and the future of Europe’s peripheries, since the research advances a new, alternative way of viewing the core-periphery relations, from the peripheries point of view, which is most of the times overlooked.

Provocative in its scope, with empirically rich case studies, the volume sheds light on the complexities of EU integration from the perspective of EU`s peripheries, revealing the deep ambivalences and contestations that characterize the relationship between the EU and its peripheral regions, in troubling times for Europe generally and Eastern regions particularly. It remains a unique, ambitious and much needed contribution to the field of EU integration studies, due to the obtained results that both produce knowledge on the EU periphery dynamics and leaves space further avenues of research.

Rebeca-Miriana Basut is a PhD candidate in political science at the National University of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA), Bucharest, Romania, and a junior researcher at the Center for European Studies SNSPA.

Article image: Alexey Larionov / Unsplash

Julkaisu Book Review: Reconfiguring EU Peripheries: Political Elites, Contestation and Geopolitical Shifts ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

The late Palestinian-American scholar Edward Said has argued in his book Culture and Imperialism  “Just as none of us is beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.”

Said’s work looks at the relation between imperial conquest, narratives and ideas justifying such relations of struggle over territories – imagined and material. The struggle about ideas, images of Europe’s Others continue to be relevant today, when it comes to which wars, occupations and genocides come to matter in relation to refugee narratives and policy in the European Union.

This struggle is essential to how Europe is constantly produced as a location based on who it is not.  The dominant narratives part of this struggle often erase historical experiences of peoples dispossessed from wars in a broad sense, which has profoundly normative implications to justify violence and selectively exclusionary policies.

As Said argues, while there has been so much written and shown of the Palestinians, the narrative of their current actuality stemming from the stories of their existence in and from displacement from Palestine, later Israel, that narrative is absent. Narratives for Said are formed in various everyday forms like folk tales, novels, but also to the academic books and debates, and more importantly to laws, and legitimacy from political tools and authority.

In this article I introduce four dominant narratives in public discourse, that shape everyday encounters, including research encounters, and academic knowledge production on and about refugees. These narratives illustrate the negotiation that fixes Europe – or a European identity – in relation to its perceived Others, the “not us”.

These narratives are violent, because they are not built on historical experiences of the peoples experiencing displacement across geographies and across times. They maintain structural violence and social inequalities. They need to be dismantled.

In the following, I will outline the four narratives of the grateful refugee, the victim refugee, the successful refugee, and the transparent refugee.

The grateful refugee

The flags of Ukraine fly on top of many public buildings across European Union, and we see the selective embrace of Ukrainians. This embrace, however, might also have an expiry date, but also creates what Mirjam Wajsberg calls circulation of fatigue related to conditions of the wider field of migration control.

There is inevitably compassion fatigue by organisations supporting people fleeing wars, racial battle fatigue for those identified as not deserving of citizenship, research fatigue for researchers endlessly writing about violent conditions of exclusion without witnessing any structural transformation in conditions of people not granted asylum. We witness the unequal mobilisations towards specific bodies from Ukraine by public institutions, civil society, and initiatives alongside the denial of other wars, occupations and genocides across the world.

Nevertheless, the social expectations of gratefulness for receiving refugees and migrants is always present. This is apparent in everyday interactions as in public discourse. The grateful refugee is also “worthy” of our protection, which is not extended equally despite their universal claims.

The social expectations of gratefulness for receiving refugees and migrants is always present.

I have argued with colleagues in a previous research article, that the narrative of the grateful refugee fits into a wider European script of migrant integration in place. In 2015, we witnessed people living in camps across EU showing various expressions of gratitude toward their “hosts”.

Part of the power asymmetries embedded in these expressions of gratitude are problematic, as they force people to present gratitude – breaches of gratitude would sever ties with local populations and the bureaucratic system, making everyday life much harder. And as researchers Paola Bachetta, Fatima El-Tayeb and Jin Haritaworn point out, the longer one lives in Europe, the stronger this paradox of being grateful as an eternal migrant. The locals’ “need to help” can become contingent on the societal expectation of a grateful refugee.

This power dynamic centres on the helper: the humanitarian aid worker, the national citizen volunteer, the public institutions of the welcoming nation state, who become visible for their help. The helper is visible in such humanitarian and volunteer work and shadows the daily labour of migrant workers and precarious citizens. Such invisible care work of receiving and sharing lives fleeing wars continue silently, often precariously within camps, asylum centres, detention centres and between marginalised groups not yet citizens.

As the Martinican psychiatrist and political philosopher Frantz Fanon underlined, “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.” From coffee to spices, and from cotton to the silks and exotic discoveries literally extracted by and from slave labour, coolies, soldiers during World War I and II, and now “migrant labour”, Europe continues to be built by its Others.

And yet, gratitude remains a dominant relation demanded from the very lands and labours feeding Europe. The famous slogan “We are here because you were there” refuses gratitude precisely based on this historical relation. It becomes important to attend to the colonial amnesia, and invisibility of the hands helping Europe, historically and till today, that is hidden in the name of gratitude demanded from refugees.

The Victim Refugee

Related to the narrative of grateful refugee is the victim refugee that is manufactured in all aspects of humanitarian border regimes. This is internalised through the images and representations of the “victim refugee”, that is long embedded in missionary work and colonial tropes of the subaltern Other. 

Anthropologist Liisa Malkki’s book The Need to Help (2015) talks about Finnish Red Cross volunteers remaining in Finland, but participating in humanitarian support towards people in Africa as fundamentally driven by the “need to help,” which emerges from isolation and from the very domestically rooted identities of such volunteers.

Such a need to help is intimately intertwined with geographical imaginaries of distance and proximity, that continue to produce Others who are defined as being in need of Europe’s help. The victim narrative focuses on the images of people not as agents, but victims to their circumstances. As the anthropologist Shahram Khosravi mentions in his auto-ethnography of an illegal traveller, that he was abnormalized and not seen as a ‘healthy’ and ‘normal’ individual, but rather treated like a child, as soon as he became the ‘client’ of refugee support upon entering the camp.

To receive the power and agency of lives navigating war and conditions of exile requires a radical transformation of such structural conditions and institutions. Poet-scholar Saba Hamzah brings attention to waves from the condition of being stranded. She calls for attending to the dynamic of moving despite the direction or strength of the waves, waves being the harsh conditions not only of warzones but also structural conditions of discrimination that follow.

The victim narrative focuses on the images of people not as agents, but victims to their circumstances.

Hamzah offers a vision of being stranded, that rejects any associations of being stuck, but a movement despite the power of the direction, and strength of the waves one is navigating. The victim narrative has always been, and continues to be, challenged in knowledge production and in everyday encounters within asylum systems.

The right to rewrite histories becomes all the more urgent to the question of who is writing whose stories, what stories fit the dominant narratives, why and how, when we think of the migration academic industrial complex. Huge grants and funding machineries feed this complex without questioning the intimate relations sustaining unequal practices of knowledge production in academia.

Universities continue to send students and researchers to do fieldwork and collect stories about refugees, but the ethical questions remain unaddressed in terms of the practices of theory building reproducing inequalities. How are stories collected? Who claims which stories to build what theories? How do these theories or concepts transform not only the lives of those being studied, but also to keep dominant narratives in place feeding inequalities? What about people having the right to rewrite histories based on historical and lived experiences from conditions of exile?

Often questions of ethics are turned into consent forms and bureaucratic procedures giving more administrative work, but also privilege to the researcher to use it to one’s own advantage than to the researched. These are urgent questions to name the violence of the structural hierarchies embedded not only in asylum systems, but also in universities in order to develop tools to dismantle such modes of representation.

The successful refugee

The narrative of the successful refugee is connected to the politics of time. On one hand, asylum regimes steal time from applicants by keeping them endlessly waiting, as Khosravi has pointed out. On the other hand, there is a push towards fast-tracking people to integrate quickly into receiving societies.

The refugee who learns the language, finds a job limited to what the asylum system determined suitable for them – often disconnected from one’s professional and educational qualifications – is “rewarded” to have the traits of a successful, model refugee. The successful refugee adapts.

Again, the person becomes less of a person, but more of a label, or even a stereotype. They become a homogenizing goal, and a success story to report that the system works!

The question remains whose bodies are feeding whose minds to produce knowledge on Europe’s stories and histories today and theories of displacement.

Universities continue to steal time from people waiting for their legal permits in using them for research very often in the form of extracting stories. Students and researchers continuously depend on “refugee stories” to legitimise their theories.

The question remains, how telling one’s story of flight to a researcher, or journalist, or artist keeps in place or transforms structural conditions of racism one faces in daily life, such as access to education, language, jobs based on one’s qualifications and interests and so on. As academics continue to fast track their careers based on publications about refugees and Europe’s violent border regimes, the time and therefore the lives of people continue to be stolen, or put in one arm’s length for such knowledges to be produced.

While the recent welcoming of certain Ukrainian refugees into research positions and education programs showed us the possibilities to open classrooms and research positions to people fleeing wars, it also showed us how little political will existed to open up the university to the lives and people fleeing other warzone areas. The question remains whose bodies are feeding whose minds to produce knowledge on Europe’s stories and histories today, and theories of displacement. Opening up universities with critical learners and scholars, whose experiences of migration, exile and displacement are as rich as the criticality of their thinking, becomes urgent to begin to break this separation.

The transparent refugee

In her book Toward a Global Idea of Race, philosopher Denise Ferreira da Silva traces how philosophical and scientific discourses have simultaneously described and instituted the modern subject as “transparent I” – Man, the subject of post-enlightenment European thought. The rational being who is self-determined and different to bodies produced as non-European.

Modern citizens enjoying freedom, security and justice are most importantly, through this lens, those enacting a ‘transparent I’. However, in the process of becoming citizens, transparency is demanded. A refugee has no right to opacity, of not being made fully visible in the process. Asylum-seekers in or arriving to the EU have to produce a “transparent I” in terms of owning their story of flight, and producing it as one shaped by individual self-determination. And, even when they do, they may not be believed, producing them as affectable to the exclusionary policies.

In the process of becoming citizens, transparency is demanded. A refugee has no right to opacity, of not being made fully visible, in the process.

A refugee according to the 1951 Refugee Convention of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – is someone fleeing her or his country, because of individual persecution rather than widespread violence. Transparency is used as a narrative of security measure against supposedly fraudulent applicants, while the decisions for rejection or acceptance of the asylum application itself is an opaque bureaucratic process with convoluted loops of tenuous accountability.

On the other hand, transparency also shapes everyday acts of citizenship, where one is continuously asked – interrogated – about their reasons for fleeing. The business of anthropology  or social sciences at large on displacement, also reinforces the European border regime by making border-crossers into objects of study, by demanding transparency.

The narratives of transparency are reproduced not only by state-actors but also in acts of (citizen) hospitality and academic practices towards people seeking life within restricted legal pathways. Investigation and scrutiny, bureaucratic or academic, are the norm. The transparent refugee is an object to the point of being or becoming absent.

Call for questioning Europe’s refugee narratives

Coming back to Said’s call mentioned in the beginning, we need to see these above narratives as struggles over ideas, forms, images, that continue to legitimise violence inside and outside EU. Most importantly, it is a call for constantly questioning the narratives and the very terms and vocabularies in which we discuss such topics of migration, borders, displacement, that hide relations of extraction, dispossession, silencing central to the making of Europe.

And most importantly, one has to question who is allowed to narrate whose story, on whose terms, why and at the cost of whose knowledges being erased. This is the constant power struggle Said talks about, as much in academia as in other spaces.

Kolar Aparna is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Arts, Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in Law, Identity and European Narratives. In the last decade, she has been teaching on themes related to postcolonial Europe. Her work is focused on building situated knowledges as part of epistemic struggles around citizenship, movement, and borders.

Article is part of Eurostorie-article series.
Eurostorie articles in Finnish.
Eurostorie artiklar på svenska.

Article image: Phil Botha / Unsplash

Julkaisu Eurostorie: Europe’s refugees – Call to question narratives fixing Europe and its Others ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

The presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) rotates among the member states every six months. The Council is a key decision-making body within the EU, representing the member states’ governments. The host states of the presidency commonly organise conferences delving into contemporary European issues and timely debates.

This spring, the host country, Belgium, invited two hundred European cultural policymakers and representatives of cultural and heritage institutions and networks to a conference entitled “Unity in Diversity? Culture, Heritage and Identity in Europe” to discuss “the role of culture and heritage in the formation and expression of European identity.”

During the past decade, many previous hosts have organised conferences on the same topic. This article discusses why the EU is fascinated with European identity and what it does with it. The approach to the topic draws on my previous research projects exploring EU cultural and heritage initiatives and their governance.

The project results broaden the view of the topic by including in the discussion citizens’ notions of Europe and European identity.  The article is based on my talk at the above-mentioned conference in Antwerp, taking place from the 15th to the 16th of April 2024.

Competing European projects

EU communication often refers to a European project. It means the EU’s aspirations towards a unified, collaborative, prosperous, and peaceful Europe based on common values and an identity drawing on shared culture and heritage.

The idea of linked European culture, heritage, and identity has obsessed European policymakers since the establishment of the European Community in 1957. The idea has remained topical due to various social, political, economic, and humanitarian challenges or crises that the EU and its European project have faced during the past decades.

The EU is not the only actor interested in a European project. The narrative of Europe as a distinct area with common values, culture, and heritage is attractive to many different groups.

The EU is not the only actor interested in a European project. The narrative of Europe as a distinct area with common values, culture, and heritage is attractive to many different groups. These include the European Identitarian Movement, which is an ethnocultural movement asserting the cultural and territorial rights of European-descended peoples, and many radical right-wing parties.

They seek to promote an exclusive idea of Europe and thus justify their xenophobic, anti-immigration, antisemitic, Islamophobic, and racist attitudes and actions. This kind of narrative contradicts the EU’s inclusive European project, which seeks to increase dialogue, inclusion, and a sense of belonging among all people living in Europe.

Tackling challenges with culture and heritage

For the European policymakers, culture and heritage are instruments to tackle the challenges impacting the EU’s European project. This is reflected, for instance, in the European Commission’s increasing interest in cultural heritage in its policy discourse (see Figure 1). During the past decade, the Commission has launched several new policies, actions, and initiatives addressing cultural heritage.

Besides the Commission, the European Parliament has been active for decades in supporting the preservation of cultural heritage and communication about Europe’s cultural memory and history. The House of European History, the Parliament’s history museum, opened in Brussels in 2017, is a flagship of these activities.

Figure 1. Increase of documents (n = 4212) including the search term ’cultural heritage’ in the EU’s official document database EUR-Lex under the domain ’EU law and case law’ from 1957 to 2023. Seven hits from 1957 have been ignored as these documents were consolidated versions of EU treaties dating from 1997 to 2010. © Tuuli Lähdesmäki

Many of the EU’s cultural and heritage initiatives have ambitious objectives, such as “counter[ing] racism and xenophobia and encourag[ing] greater tolerance for other cultures across Europe” and “invit[ing] Europe to respond to the social, political, and economic challenges of the culture sector“, as the European Commission’s website describes the aims of the European Heritage Days.

The key political utility of culture and cultural heritage draws on their potential effect on people’s feelings. Professor Kiral Klaus Patel has underlined this aspect by noting how EU cultural policy is designed “to win the hearts and minds” of European citizens. The policy discourse in the EU’s broad cultural programmes, such as the current Creative Europe programme, explicitly refers to European identity and defines the strengthening of it as one of the priorities of the programme.

Since the 1990s, several scholars have criticised the concept of identity for emphasising it as fixed instead of a process in which our understanding of ourselves and others constantly transforms.

In addition to European identity, many EU cultural and heritage initiatives seek to “increase citizens’ sense of belonging to a common cultural area”, as the decision of the European Capital of Culture says, or aim at “strengthening European citizens’ sense of belonging to the Union” and “common space”, as the decision of the European Heritage Label says.

The emphasis on belonging in EU policy discourse reflects the conceptual debate on identity in scholarship. Since the 1990s, several scholars have criticised the concept of identity for emphasising it as fixed instead of a process in which our understanding of ourselves and others constantly transforms.

These scholars, such as Elspeth Probyn, Marco Antonsich, and Nira Yuval-Davis, have noted how the concept of belonging enables us to capture more accurately people’s changing needs and desires for attachment to other people, places, or modes of being. Belonging is a less definitive concept: one may feel belonging to something, such as Europe, but may not necessarily identify with it, and thus does not have European identity.

What do the participants in EU cultural initiatives think about Europe?

My research team and I have studied how people participating in EU cultural initiatives perceive the European dimension of culture and how they associate with Europe. The first of these studies explored the visitors of three European Capitals of Culture: Pécs2010 in Hungary, Tallinn2011 in Estonia, and Turku2011 in Finland.

The European Capital of Culture is the EU’s flagship cultural initiative, wherein the European Commission annually designates European cities with this title. The data for this study included 1425 survey responses gathered among the visitors to cultural events in the cities.

The responses revealed diverse ways of perceiving ‘the European’ in the European Capitals of Culture. The most common responses addressed the respondents’ everyday experiences of encountering European people – artists, performers, and visitors from other European countries – and enjoying works of art and events created or produced by such artists and performers.

The lack of history in the responses can be interpreted in several ways. For instance, history is often related to identity formation at the national, not the European, level.

Moreover, the respondents recognised and identified ‘the European’ through whatProfessor Michael Billig calls “banal” forms of culture. These forms included well-known symbols of the EU, such as the EU flag, and easily recognised features of diversity in Europe, such as people speaking and performing in foreign languages. ‘The European’ was, thus, mostly perceived from a pragmatic point of view and not drawing on the content of culture.

The respondents rarely discussed ‘the European’ as based on common European culture, history, heritage, traditions, monuments, or historical sites. When they did, they were likely to be highly educated. In general, the notions of ‘the European’ in the data were notably non-historical.

The lack of history in the responses can be interpreted in several ways. For instance, history is often related to identity formation at the national, not the European, level. History, heritage, and traditions were indeed more often discussed in the data related to local, regional, and national culture.

Two approaches to Europe

The second study focused on the European Heritage Label, the EU’s flagship heritage initiative through which the European Commission biannually awards European cultural heritage sites. The study included 271 visitor interviews conducted in 2017 and 2018 at 11 labelled sites in ten European countries. The interviews reveal two main approaches to Europe, namely the ‘Europe of people’ and ‘Europe of nations’.

The first approach is characterised by pragmatism: the interviewees emphasised people’s personal agency and potential to contribute to making Europe. For them, the notion of Europe commonly drew from their experiences of being mobile in Europe and connecting and interacting with people with diverse national and cultural backgrounds.

The interviewees also were asked to describe what European identity is like and whether they feel European themselves. Most of the interviewees felt European, but it was much more difficult for them to describe European identity.

In the second approach, the interviewees underlined Europe as an entity consisting of bounded geographical areas, such as nations and regions, with specific cultural characteristics. These interviewees greatly valued the cultural and national differences inside the EU and regarded them as worth preserving.

The interviewees also were asked to describe what European identity is like and whether they feel European themselves. Most of the interviewees felt European, but it was much more difficult for them to describe European identity. Some of them criticised the concept for being too restrictive and having exclusive and static connotations.

Let’s keep talking about European identity

There is a broad body of literature seeking to define Europe, ‘the European’, and European identity. Some scholars have identified different models of understanding European identity, such as cultural, civic, political, and pragmatic models. Others have sought to identify certain historical phases and phenomena, such as Hellenist aesthetics, Roman law, Christianity, and modernity, characterising European culture and identity.

In recent literature, Europe is commonly perceived as a conceptual entity that has been both historically and philosophically a “moving target” and, thus, so “elusive that it is doubtful whether [it has] any reality at all outside the imagination”, as scholars Ullrich Kockel, Máiréad Nic Craith, and Jonas Frykman have noted.

In recent literature, Europe is commonly perceived as a conceptual entity that has been both historically and philosophically a “moving target”.

Europe is an idea, discourse, and narrative, and thus, there are several Europes and European cultures, heritages, and identities. We cannot ever find a final definition of them since they are plural and constantly transforming. All definitions are inevitably exclusive and inadequate.

More important than finding definitions is, that we keep discussing Europe, ‘the European’, and European identity, and that diverse people in Europe participate in these discussions and bring to the debates their views and experiences.

Moreover, it is crucial that all of us are willing to listen to others’ views and experiences, have a dialogue with them, and broaden our own understanding of Europe. The key role of the EU in this is to support actors and projects seeking to create spaces, events, and platforms for such discussions, listening, and dialogue. 

PhD, DSocSc Tuuli Lähdesmäki is an associate professor of art history at the University of Jyväskylä.

Article image: Antoine Schibler / Unsplash

Julkaisu European identity – The EU’s obsession and opportunity ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

The European Union has devoted great attention to climate change over the last decades in one of the most recondite areas of the world – the Arctic region. The Arctic region is divided between 8 nations, is home to 4 million people, and is an area where climate change is felt at a greater level.

The debates at the European Parliament have shown there is a certain level of dissensus on what this EU policy in the Arctic should be, how it should be designed, and it is also a good point of departure for the analysis of European integration theories.

European integration theories and Arctic policy

The scientific literature on European integration theories mostly dates back to post-war times and is dominated by a small number of theoretical approaches and schools of thought.  When analyzing the success of the first years of European integration after the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, many authors started analyzing the reasons for these very first steps of European integration.

Ernst Haas (1921-1986), former professor at the University of Berkeley, Leon Lindberg (1932-), professor emeritus of political science, and cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985) are considered to be the first and most important theorists, who formed the first school of European integration theory, neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalist theory states that supranational institutions, at first the High Authority and then the European Commission, were the ones responsible for the growth of European integration by acting as consensus makers amidst the interests of individual states.

The European Commission, established in 1958, became an institution dedicated to the development of consensus in difficult policy areas, thus building legitimacy and precedence for more policy areas to fall under a supranational type of decision-making in the European context.

Rather than offering sweeping theories, contemporary critics focus on specific cases, where various supranational, national and civil society actors can at times have great political influence in legislative outcome.

The neofunctionalist school was dominant in explaining how European integration worked until the late 1960s. However, growing academic criticism started to appear that began by attacking some of the principles of neofunctionalism, which, in their view, did not properly consider the role and effort of the individual nation states and their economic and political interests.

This opposing school was later named intergovernmentalism and its most important scholars were Harvard political scientist Stanley Hoffmann (1928-2015), Princeton university professor of politics Andrew Moravcsik (1957-), and economic historian Alan Milward (1935-2010).

Their view was that the individual interest of states was the main drive behind European integration and not the political influence of the European Commission. It was the political and economic interest of the leading European states that guided its governments to a consensus-push.

Without going into too much detail, more contemporary mixed theories, such as constructivism, distributive bargaining theory, and rational-choice theory have tried to use the positive aspects of both the neofunctionalists and the intergovernmentalists to develop analysis focusing on states together with supranational institutions. The growth of the powers of the European Parliament (EP) after the 1970s and particularly after the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 also led to a growth in theoretical literature with the intergovernmentalist perceptions starting to come under scrutiny.

Rather than offering sweeping theories, contemporary critics focus on specific cases, where various supranational, national and civil society actors can at times have great political influence in legislative outcome.

The distinct aspects of Arctic policy

The specific political and societal situation in the Arctic region is interesting if one is to debate it considering the various European integration theories.

Due to its economic, geographical, and scientific importance, the Arctic region has many interested states, institutions and attentive civil society organizations. The Arctic region currently envelops parts of Russia, the United States, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Greenland (Kingdom of Denmark), and Canada. Only Finland, Sweden and Denmark are EU members, although Norway and Iceland belong to the European Economic Area (EEA), which puts them into the European integration framework.

These 8 countries have a seat in the most important intergovernmental forum in the Arctic: the Arctic Council, created after the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. Thirteen other countries around the world have an observer state position, and numerous other civil society organizations also participate in other ways. The European Union does not have an observer status as its request was rejected by Canada in 2013.

The EU has had an active interest in the Arctic region as a dimension of environmental policy, indigenous rights, and, to some extent, security policies.

The EU is nevertheless a great economic supporter of Arctic cooperation and Arctic policy, in all its complexity. However, many decisions regarding the Arctic are made through intergovernmental practices, which often generate dissensus between states, such as in the case of Norway and the EU regarding fisheries, which would give credence to the intergovernmentalist school.

Additionally, the EU has had an active interest in the Arctic region as a dimension of environmental policy, indigenous rights, and, to some extent, security policies.

Being one of the original 15 measures to be decided under equal codecision, EU environmental policy is formulated between the EP, the European Commission (EC) and the Council of the EU. In other words, in important policy areas, the deliberative bodies of the EU deliberate within themselves, but also together with other decision-making institutions of the EU. Indeed, the EP has devoted much of its attention to environmental policy throughout all of its legislatures.

From the perspective of rational choice theory or distributive bargaining theory, national or supranational institutions do try to gain as much political leverage as they can with the intent to influence the outcome of legislation to the highest extent possible. However, the EP debates have also shown great political cleavages both on left-right spectrum but also on environmental or national economic predispositions.

The European Parliament and Arctic Policy

Parliamentary decision-making procedure and debates between very different parties are an essential part of the EP’s functions. The EP has frequently sought to develop fast consensus under the ordinary legislative procedure. Studies have shown that, statistically speaking, legislation has been most likely completed through codecision between the three EU legislative institutions after 2009 in the most rapid manner, in parliamentary terms, on the “first reading”.

However, despite the extensive use of codecision, the EP has not reached political unity when it comes to its Arctic policy. Based on the parliamentary debates, it seems that different EU parties have had somewhat different opinions on how to develop a more effective supranational and EU-wide Arctic policy.

The frequency of the debates dealing with Arctic policy has also grown throughout the EP legislatures. Some of the main issues have related to the EU’s position towards the Arctic Council versus the desire for other parallel strategies to make the EU an even more important actor in the region without an involvement in or with the Arctic Council.

The integrity and uniformity of EU policy towards this region is difficult when there are so many interests at stake – whether party interests, national interests, EU institutions’ interests, economic, environmental, defense-related – and when opinions are so varied even between and amidst EU institutions and member states.

Debates were also frequently related to policy priorities, perhaps less surprisingly, showing the friction between environmental and economic policy interests. The pursuit of a supranational policy towards the Arctic versus an intergovernmental approach still seems to generate dissent as well.

The integrity and uniformity of EU policy towards this region is difficult when there are so many interests at stake – whether party interests, national interests, EU institutions’ interests, economic, environmental, defense-related – and when opinions are so varied even between and amidst EU institutions and member states.

By analyzing EP debates, one can see that although there are tendencies that seem to depict party-level inclinations and left-right cleavages, the relative uncertainty of this problematic region makes MEPs have a varied approach.

Nevertheless, the EP has offered numerous resolutions in 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2017. The EP has pushed for a proximity with the Antarctic policy, but later dropped it. It has also argued for a jointly coordinated EU policy and strategy in 2014 and 2017, calling for a ban on heavy fuel oil use.

The EP has, notwithstanding its own divisions, been a strong supporter for a Europeanization, or, in other words, a supranationalization of political decision-making regarding the EU’s Arctic policy. This approach favors inter-institutional agreements despite intergovernmental friction in specific issues, such as with Norway or Canada when dealing with fisheries or energy extraction.

The global impact of this region makes it an important policy issue even for southern European countries.

It is the struggle between various political interests designed at the state-level, but also at the supranational level that makes the EU’s Arctic policy a very interesting issue to be analyzed under European integration theories.

The global impact of this region makes it an important policy issue even for southern European countries. France, Italy, and Germany also favor a supranational approach to the Arctic, while Nordic EU countries seem quite interested in economic possibilities with environmentally safe methods.

This phenomenon is perhaps due to a state of relative defensiveness towards this area by Arctic Council states, particularly by Denmark, while other Nordic EU countries with high expertise in energy extraction by environmental methods show a bit more support for a EU role in the Arctic.

Is intergovernmentalism still king in the Arctic Policy?

Intergovernmentalism and its methodology seem to be a very important point of analysis for the EU’s Artic policy. The EU’s supranational interests and legislative advancements have greatly evolved in recent years, but they seem to be frequently confronted with older partners in Artic affairs.

Unlike other common policies in the European Union such as the Common agricultural policy that has had 60 years of evolution and consensus-building, the EU’s Arctic policy is still a bit far from being a common policy due to international legal constraints and divergent states’ interests such as with the United States, the Russian Federation or even Canada or Norway.

Individual states still seem to have the upper hand when dealing with Arctic policy whereas EU institutions still seem to suffer from internal dissensus and path-dependency.

Individual states still seem to have the upper hand when dealing with Arctic policy whereas EU institutions still seem to suffer from internal dissensus and path-dependency which seem to give more credence to the intergovernmental school of European integration theory and to a general preference for an intergovernmental style of politics.

With time, and perhaps with the search for greater consensus, the EU’s Arctic policy can maybe develop itself into a true common policy having the EU become an equal and perhaps greatly influential partner in the Arctic region.

Luís Sargento Freitas received his doctorate from the University of Jyväskylä in Finland in 2018 and is presently developing other research.

Julkaisu The parliamentarization of the European Union’s Arctic policy ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.