Georgia, a small South Caucasian country, has long been considered a leader in the European Union’s Eastern Partnership program. Over the past two decades, relations with Brussels have significantly deepened.

Georgia has secured a free trade agreement and visa-free travel for citizens holding biometric passports, while benefiting from sustained EU financial, political and diplomatic support. This includes consistent backing for Georgia’s territorial integrity, as 20 percent of its territory remains occupied by the Russian Federation. 

Georgia’s current government, led by the Georgian Dream party, maintained largely stable relations with the EU for nearly a decade after coming to power in 2012. It positioned itself as pro-European in both domestic and foreign policy, while simultaneously pursuing what it described as a policy of “not irritating Russia,” which emphasised largely non-confrontational positions towards Moscow.

However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly reshaped political rhetoric in Georgia, contributing to the rise of strongly anti-European messaging. Much of this messaging has been spread by major information outlets affiliated with the ruling party and known for their pro-government stance.

The narratives circulating among the public increasingly mirror patterns common in Russian information campaigns, at times echoing similar discursive frames and messaging strategies. This article outlines the core narrative and messaging strategies that have gained special strength in Georgia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The anti-European turn, accompanied by intensified disinformation and propaganda efforts linked to shifting geopolitical dynamics, as well as continuing undemocratic decisions at the legislative and executive levels, has strained Georgia-EU relations.

Georgia is now a subject of growing scepticism, contributing to the suspension of several EU-funded initiatives and raising concerns about potential future restrictive measures, which will suspend the benefits, such as a visa-free regime, firstly for the decisionmakers, followed by ordinary citizens.

Post-2022 regional changes – Russia’s decreasing hard power influence

Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has been strong for decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The occupation of Georgian territories – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the conflict in Karabakh, Armenia’s dependence on Russia due to its regional isolation, Russia’s influence on Azerbaijan, and later the introduction of a peacekeeping mission in Karabakh have enabled Moscow to maintain hard power in the region. Russia is also effectively using soft power measures, particularly by promoting ideological narratives targeting growing EU and NATO influences.

Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has been strong for decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had significant implications for the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan was able to regain control over Karabakh in 2023. The Karabakh region has been a source of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the early 1990s.

After the outbreak of second Karabakh war in 2020, Russia deployed a peacekeeping mission in the region, which proved unable to effectively monitor the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in 2024 withdrew from the region. Considering the shifting regional realities, Armenia has started deepening its connections with the EU, attempting to balance Russian influence.

Altogether, these developments have left Russia with decreasing hard power influence in the region. However, this has opened space for informational influence strategies. Ironically, Georgia, the country that has historically been the most pro-European in the South Caucasus, appeared particularly vulnerable during this period to such campaigns, especially those targeting pro-Western and particularly pro-EU views.

Georgia’s vulnerability and echoes of Russian rhetoric

As mentioned, for almost a decade the Georgian Dream ruling party’s foreign policy has been based on balancing between the West and Russia. For years, this approach was communicated to the public as a pragmatic strategy, given Georgia’s geographic position and the continued military threat from Russia.

However, in parallel, over the last decade Georgia has also opened space for groups, media outlets and political actors using more radical rhetoric, sometimes openly pro-Russian.

Examples of these include far-right political actors such as the Alliance of Patriots, Alt-Info, and television channels that have been promoting anti-EU narratives. In their discourse, these actors have often attempted to shift public attention away from Russian threats toward vaguer concerns, such as the need to protect Georgian identity from foreign, primarily Western negative influences, including what they describe as “LGBTQI propaganda.” These actors have at times been regarded as informal “satellites” of the government, voicing messages that the authorities themselves were still avoiding publicly.

However, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the government itself has moved to the forefront of Euroscepticism, and at times openly propagandistic rhetoric. Recent trends indicate a shift toward clearly anti-Western, and occasionally hostile, messaging. The narratives have also increasingly portrayed Ukraine, historically a key partner of Georgia, as a negative actor.

Many of the messages constantly circulating among the Georgian public and supported by the government, echo Russian rhetorical patterns, particularly in their portrayal of the EU as a threat.

In some cases, Ukrainian leadership has been framed responsible for failing to prevent Russian aggression, while similar arguments have been extended domestically by accusing Georgia’s previous government of provoking Russian aggression in 2008. The launch and completion of a parliamentary investigation in relation to the 2008 war has further been used to reinforce these narratives and provide them with greater political legitimacy.

Many of the messages constantly circulating among the Georgian public and supported by the government, echo Russian rhetorical patterns, particularly in their portrayal of the EU as a threat and in their aim and ability to generate suspicion and confusion among the public. This has long fueled concerns about Georgian Dream’s potential ties to Russia.

At the same time, some observers argue that the party and its founder, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili is primarily driven by own economic and security interests, while strategically using well-established informational mechanisms to maintain political power.

Core narratives  

In the Georgian case, social media does play a significant role in spreading anti-Western narratives, but reports show that traditional actors still play a significant role, like political figures and parties. Traditional media remains key too, with the most influential TV channels widely seen as supporting the government and actively deploying the same messaging.

This is especially relevant for reaching populations living outside the capital, in regions where these TV channels are sometimes the only source of information. It is interesting to note that, UK has already sanctioned Imedi and Postv channels, widely believed to be pro-governmental, by the end of February, for spreading misleading information about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Many of these narratives repeat ideas and messaging that originate in Russian information campaigns and comparisons are provided to illustrate these parallels.

The data from several reports by different international and local organizations in Georgia, as well as limited number of academic publications on this topic suggest the existence of key narratives since 2022, that have been actively promoted among the Georgian public, both by the government and by satellite actors operating within the country.

Some key examples are outlined below. Many of these narratives repeat ideas and messaging that originate in Russian information campaigns and comparisons are provided to illustrate these parallels.

Georgian Sovereign Democracy

“Sovereign democracy” is a well-known Russian concept used to describe the governing model promoted by the Russian state. In simple terms, it can be understood as democracy practiced on a country’s own terms.

At the same time, Russian officials have consistently argued that their system is equal to, or even superior to Western democratic models. A key characteristic in this concept is that criticism of the system is often portrayed as suspicious or hostile, with critics frequently labeled as foreign agents, unfriendly actors or political enemies.

In recent years, similar messaging has played a key role in government rhetoric and among supporters of the Georgian authorities, particularly regarding EU political influence. The core argument suggests that Georgia no longer needs advice from its European partners on how to build democracy, while simultaneously promoting the view that Georgian democracy and the rule of law are in better condition than in parts of Europe.

Legislation supporting these restrictive practices has often been described by the ruling party as analogous to laws in the United States or Europe.

This messaging became especially dominant since November 2024, when the Georgian government decided to pause EU accession talks. The decision was followed by mass protests that continue daily across Georgia, as well as large-scale government suppression targeting civil society, opposition groups and independent media.

Legislation supporting these restrictive practices has often been described by the ruling party as analogous to laws in the United States or Europe. However, the European Commission has issued critical reports on these developments, portraying them as a serious threat to Georgia’s democratic future.

The narrative that “Georgia does not need advice on democracy,” often reinforced through selectively presented or manipulated examples of police misconduct, corruption or governance failures within the EU, closely resembles the Russian concept of “sovereign democracy,” which has long been used to shape public perceptions and justify political violence.

Stability vs. Ukrainisation

The narrative portraying Georgia as a “land of peace and stability under the Georgian Dream” government has been one of the most prominent since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It has been used to support the argument that Georgian Dream has saved the country from opening a so-called “second front” against Russia, while claiming that the collective West has been pressuring Georgia to do so, often through the vague notion of a “global war party.”

This messaging became particularly intense ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, aiming to instrumentalise societal fears of war in a country that has experienced several internal and external conflicts over the past 35 years.

The narrative has been closely linked to developments in Ukraine, promoting the perception that the West seeks Georgia’s “Ukrainisation” by opening a second front, while portraying the ruling party as the only political force capable of preventing such a scenario.

The broader practice of shaping public opinion against the collective West has often been identified as a well-established Russian strategy, in which conspiracy theories play a central role.

A particularly visible illustration of this messaging appeared in Tbilisi and other parts of Georgia ahead of the 2024 elections, where campaign banners displayed images of destroyed Ukrainian cities alongside images of peaceful Georgian landscapes. The campaign provoked strong critical reactions in Ukraine as well.

The broader practice of shaping public opinion against the collective West has often been identified as a well-established Russian strategy, in which conspiracy theories play a central role. The conspiracy narrative surrounding a so-called “global war party,” portraying Western governments and European institutions as opponents for the peace in Ukraine, has also been widely used in official Russian rhetoric.

Similar messaging patterns have appeared in Georgian political discourse, leading many researchers and practitioners to argue that Georgia is currently experiencing extensive, multi-level Russian influence operations, including efforts to shape public perceptions through disinformation and propaganda.

EU as the enemy of Georgian traditions

One of the most established anti-European narratives in Georgia has targeted Euro-integration by claiming that EU membership would destroy Georgia’s cultural identity and traditions.

This narrative has been particularly promoted by groups such as Alt-Info and similar actors that position themselves as defenders of Georgian traditions. Their rhetoric is often characterized by extreme right-wing views combined with religious arguments suggesting that opposing certain Western values is a moral and cultural obligation.

The narrative has specifically focused on sexual minority rights, claiming that EU membership would force Georgia to legalize same-sex marriage and allow Pride marches in the country.

Although other actors, including some religious figures have also contributed to spreading these messages, one of the most influential promoters of this discourse has recently been the government itself, which has emphasized “family sanctity” as a core national value while introducing restrictive legislation targeting sexual minorities.

Although public support for EU membership in Georgia remains consistently high, the persistence of Russian informational influence continues to present a significant challenge.

This approach is not unique to Georgia, as restrictive policies and rhetoric targeting sexual minorities have long been present in Russia. What is particularly notable, however, is that several studies indicate that Russia has systematically promoted such narratives through various channels, while supporting groups that adapt and localize these messages.

The broader objective of this strategy is to create distorted perceptions of Europe, undermine trust in European institutions and foster skepticism toward Euro-integration. Although public support for EU membership in Georgia remains consistently high, the persistence of Russian informational influence continues to present a significant challenge.

Impact on perceptions, Euroscepticism and EU-Georgia relations

The most critical question is: what impact do these information campaigns have on Georgian people’s perceptions of the collective West, and on the country’s aim to join the EU? As noted above, support for European integration remains strong among the Georgian public, with almost three-quarters of the population still supportive.

However, a closer look at surveys over the years reveals a noticeable decrease in positive perceptions and trust toward the EU in the last two years alone. EUNeighbours East has been producing annual survey results on the EU’s image and trust in Georgia, and comparing the reports from 2023 and 2025 clearly shows a drop of more than 10% in both categories.

The most critical question is: what impact do these information campaigns have on Georgian people’s perceptions of the collective West, and on the country’s aim to join the EU?

It is reasonable to consider that information campaigns influence public opinion and trust. Constant campaigns, originating from influential sources can succeed in creating confusion and prompting people to question previously held beliefs, eroding trust in the EU and in the long term, potentially decreasing support for integration.

The undemocratic tendencies and continued anti-EU rhetoric have left their mark on Georgian-EU relations. The European Union has repeatedly warned Georgian authorities that continuing this path will ultimately undo all the positive developments achieved over the years under different administrations.

The EU has also expressed concerns about anti-Union narratives in recent years. Georgia’s candidate status is currently largely symbolic, and the accession process is effectively frozen. The EU warns that it will remain so until the ruling party reverses course.

Concerning shifts and geopolitical influence through informational and ideological channels

The growing similarities between Georgian government messaging and narratives long associated with Russian informational strategies highlight a concerning shift in Georgia’s political and communicative landscape. Russian-style anti-Western rhetoric by ruling political figures and influential media, conspiracy theory-driven messaging, and hostile identity-based narratives have affected public trust in Western institutions and complicated Georgia’s relationship with the European Union.

These developments demonstrate that geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus is no longer exercised primarily through military or economic leverage, but increasingly through informational and ideological channels.

Georgia’s case also illustrates how external narratives can be localised and adapted to domestic political agendas, particularly during periods of geopolitical instability and societal vulnerability.

Georgia’s case also illustrates how external narratives can be localised and adapted to domestic political agendas, particularly during periods of geopolitical instability and societal vulnerability. The persistence of strong public support for EU membership suggests that Georgia’s European orientation remains continuous and deeply rooted. However, the continued use of anti-European discourse increases the risks of gradually reshaping public perceptions.

Understanding these dynamics is essential not only for Georgia’s democratic future but also for broader European engagement in the region. Addressing information influence operations within the context of Russia’s shifted regional strategies will remain critically important regarding Georgia and its European trajectory.

Nino Chanadiri is a political science researcher and analyst specialising in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. For years, she has contributed analytical and research-driven content to reputable organisations and journals in Georgia, Estonia and Poland, focusing on socio-political developments in South Caucasus, wider Eastern Europe and Baltic Sea region.

Article image: Etienne Dayer / Unsplash

Julkaisu Sovereignty, Stability and Suspicion: Russian Messaging in Georgia’s EU Debate ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

Film is a powerful medium for expressing cultural and social meanings, discussing political ideas and values, and driving economic growth. Since its foundation, the European Union (EU) has recognised and sought to exploit the potential of European film for such purposes. The EU also regards European film as a cultural heritage to be preserved and passed on to the future.

EU cultural policy is based on intertwined cultural, political, and economic interests. Since 1991, the EU has been supporting the European film industry through the Creative Europe MEDIA programme to encourage the development, distribution, and promotion of European audiovisual works.

The main challenges for the European film industry have been the low circulation of European films outside their countries of production and its low competitiveness compared to the US film industry.

The challenge is real and difficult to address. For example, in the EU Strategy on European Film in the Digital Era, the European Commission noted that 63% of all films released in the EU in 2012 were European, but only 33% of admissions were to European films. Meanwhile, US productions accounted for 20% of releases and 65% of admissions. Over the past decade, there hasn’t been much change in the productivity and circulation of European films, despite EU support. The market share of US productions in the EU was 58% in 2021 and 63% in 2022.

To increase the competitiveness of the European film industry, the European Commission is funding research projects to provide a comprehensive understanding of the industry and different perspectives on its challenges. The REBOOT project seeks to identify the strengths and gaps in the competitiveness of the European film industry and to explore emerging audiences.

The heritage meanings can inspire audiences and thus be used to promote European films. However, there are several challenges involved.

Multiple objectives of EU film policy

The EU approaches and regulates the European film industry from different and sometimes contradictory perspectives. The first decade of EU audiovisual policy focused on the integration of the European film market on the one hand, and the celebration of cinematic art by emphasising its cultural and linguistic diversity on the other. This balancing act between commerce and art, as described by Anna Herold, Head of the European Commission’s Audiovisual and Media Services Policy Unit, has recently been extended to other policy objectives.

EU film policy has increasingly emphasised the twin goals of strengthening the competitiveness of the European film industry and using European film as a tool in the EU’s external relations.

Over the past decade, EU film policy has increasingly emphasised the twin goals of strengthening the competitiveness of the European film industry in Europe and beyond and using European film as a tool in the EU’s external relations. This emphasis has expanded the EU’s film policy balancing act to include new components, global competitiveness and public diplomacy.

In addition, identity policy goals have from the very beginning encompassed EU film policy, as well as EU cultural policy in general. Such policies seek to promote the idea of Europe as a cultural and value-based space. The Creative Europe programme, for example, states in its first two sentences that “cultural and creative sectors are part of European identity” and that their expressions manifest, among other things, common values.

Film as Europe’s cultural heritage

EU policy considers film as an important European cultural heritage that manifests the cultural diversity of Europeans and allows to learn about the continent’s past. Therefore, the EU has developed policies to protect this heritage.

As early as 2004, the European Commission stated in its communication on the legal aspects of cinematographic and other audiovisual works: “In order to ensure that the European film heritage is passed down to future generations, it has to be systematically collected, catalogued, preserved and restored.” In this regard, the Commission recommended the establishment in each Member State of special institutes for the preservation and promotion of film heritage at national level.

The EU’s interest in preserving Europe’s film heritage has been closely linked to the goal of increasing access to audiovisual content through digitisation.

The EU’s interest in preserving Europe’s film heritage has been closely linked to the goal of increasing access to audiovisual content through digitisation. Throughout the 2000s, the EU has sought to remove various technical and legal barriers to digitised cultural content and to increase access to cultural heritage through digital technologies and shared platforms. The first of these platforms, Europeana, was launched in 2008.

The EU’s latest attempt to share digital cultural heritage, including film, builds on the Commission’s 2021 recommendation for a common European data space for cultural heritage.

Researchers Tuuli Lähdesmäki, Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus and Katja Mäkinen have noted that EU policy on audiovisual heritage is about the interplay between medium and content. When the policy focuses on the medium, films, television, and radio programmes are considered a heritage in themselves. When the policy focuses on content, film, television, and radio are treated as audiovisual tools for conveying content, such as events and sites, regarded as cultural heritage.

In some EU initiatives, such as A Season of Classic Films organised since 2019, these heritage meanings are inseparable. In this initiative, classic European films have been screened at historic venues and major film festivals across Member States, showcasing the restoration of old films and the European history, traditions, and heritage they convey.

Films convey personal cultural heritage

Although EU policy acknowledges film as a cultural heritage, it has not yet recognised the more intimate heritage meanings that film can have for individuals. These meanings were revealed while researching European Film Festivals, also known as EU Film Festivals, organised by EU delegations with the embassies and cultural attachés of EU Member States and local film organisations in third countries. Such festivals have been organised without explicit funding since 1985, but in 2018 the European Commission launched a special support instrument to better coordinate their implementation.

European Film Festivals screen recent films from EU countries and organise various film-related side events for film professionals and audiences. For the EU, the main objective of these festivals is to strengthen public diplomacy, dialogue, and cooperation between the EU and third countries and their various stakeholders within and outside the film industry.

The festivals also aim to contribute to a more positive image of the EU and to promote European ideas and values. Through the screening of recent films and the organisation of side events, festivals also contribute to the promotion of European film outside Europe.

European ex-patriates and migrants and citizens with a European background and their families form an important audience for festivals in multicultural metropolises.

REBOOT project researchers Tuuli Lähdesmäki, Mafalda Dâmaso, Kaisa Hiltunen, Ruken Doğu Erdede, Elif Akçalı, and Melis Behlil examined the organisation of European Film Festivals through grey literature and interviews with EU delegations and festival organisers in eight non-EU countries, namely Argentina, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. The data from two of these countries, the UK and Canada, differed slightly from the others.

Tuuli Lähdesmäki’s analysis of the data from the UK and Canada showed that European films have a specific heritage meaning that is not addressed in the EU film policy. This meaning is based on film as a transmission of personal cultural heritage, including historical, cultural and family related elements that shape one’s identity and sense of belonging to a cultural group.

The UK and Canada include populations and/or large numbers of migrants and ex-patriates with heritage and cultural roots in (continental) Europe. According to interviews with festival organisers, European ex-patriates and migrants and citizens with a European background and their families form an important audience for festivals in multicultural metropolises, such as London, Toronto, Ottawa, and Vancouver. Such audiences are eager to see European films from their (or their parents’, grandparents’ or relatives’) home countries, to experience their culture, cultural roots, and cultural environment, and to hear their native language. For them, watching European films is motivated by the films’ ability to convey personal cultural heritage.

Heritage meanings in audience development

EU cultural policy discourses have identified film as a cultural heritage and have initiated policies to promote and safeguard film as such. Film as heritage is also mentioned in the guidelines for European Film Festival organisers.

However, neither the policies nor the guidelines recognise the intimate heritage meanings that European films can have. Such a heritage meaning is important for a specific audience segment, which could be better recognised as a potential market niche for European films.

However, the promotion of European films for audiences with European cultural roots in third countries is not without risks and challenges due to Europe’s colonialist and imperialist past. In countries with colonial histories, the promotion of European films for audiences with European cultural roots is problematic, especially in the context of the European Film Festivals, which aim to strengthen international cultural relations and intercultural dialogue. The challenges of promoting European films and Europe through the EU-initiated festival were acknowledged in our South African data.

Heritage meanings of European films are important for a specific audience segment, which could be better recognised as a potential market niche for European films.

In general, niche marketing of European films for specific audiences faces practical challenges, since the resources used for the promotion of the European films are modest compared to more competitive industries, such as the US film industry and Hollywood productions.

Audiences have different reasons for watching films. Personal heritage meanings are one of them. Such meanings could be better recognised in the development of audiences for European films. However, such niche marketing must avoid the risk of underlining European colonial legacies in third countries.

PhD, DSocSc Tuuli Lähdesmäki is an associate professor of art history at the University of Jyväskylä and the PI of the consortium partnership in the REBOOT project.

Article image: Aneta Pawlik / Unsplash

Julkaisu Heritage meanings of European film and their potential for audience development ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.