Palm oil plays a significant role in the Indonesian economy. In early 2024, a controversial issue about oil palm occurred again in Indonesia. One of the chocolate producers inserted “palm oil free” label in their container, and became a target of protest by a religious farmer group Santri Tani. The protesters claimed, that labeling distributed food products palm oil free, the producer would commit state treason.

In Indonesia, food product labeled with ‘palm oil free’ is unacceptable. When such labels are found, the Ministry of Trade can ask for the products to be withdrawn from the market. The label violates the regulation of the National Agency of Drug and Food Control of Indonesia no. 20/2021 on Processed Food Label (article 67 point 2, l) which states “business actors are prohibited from including statements or information that directly or indirectly denigrate the goods and/or services of other parties.”

The article does not name specific products, and there has been only two cases affected by this regulation so far, with both products, asserting the “palm oil free” labels.

Palm oil is a complex economic issue. Indonesia and Europe have their own perspectives, mainly based on different conceptions of sustainability. Europe wants to regulate palm oil so that the EU citizens would not consume products that contribute to deforestation or forest degradation worldwide, through the EU Deforestation-Free Regulation (EUDR). Thus, it is for environmental sustainability. Meanwhile, Indonesia, the world’s biggest producer and exporter of palm oil (60%), claims the EU regulation on palm oil will impact the global food market, even food security in the future.

Palm oil is a complex economic issue. Indonesia and Europe have their own perspectives, mainly based on different conceptions of sustainability.

There are 16 million hectares of oil palm plantations in Indonesia, and 41% of these or around 7 million hectares belong to  8 million small farmers, and trade disruption would put their lives at risk. For the Indonesian authorities, palm oil is an economic opportunity, thus sustainability is about fairness, poverty eradication, and society. Such different conceptions of sustainability regarding palm oil remain in discussions between the EU and Indonesia (also Malaysia).

Indonesia had banned palm oil exports in 2022 due to the high domestic price of vegetable oil and this shocked many countries, including the farmers in Indonesia. The ban only lasted for two months, yet this shifted the paradigm of the oil palm industry in global food (and energy) security clarifying that Indonesia did not want to be dictated, especially when there was shortage of vegetable oil (sunflower oil) in Europe because of Russia-Ukraine war.

EUDR and EU perspective 

In 2023, the regulation on deforestation-free products, known as EUDR, came into force. Large companies had 18 months to prepare (with an additional 6 months for small enterprises). EUDR is designed to regulate products consumed by the EU citizens so as not to contribute to deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and biodiversity loss.

EU enacted the regulation that commodities representing the largest share of deforestation, such as palm oil (33.95%), soy (32.83%), wood (8.62%), cocoa (7.54%), coffee (7.01%) and beef (5.01%) must certify their products for having deforestation-free land. Specifically for palm oil, the certification must come from the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).

Through EUDR, EU aspires to a global environmental leadership role in addressing ecological and social concerns associated with trade-driven tropical deforestation and forest degradation. However call for a revision of this regulation came also from the EU members and their local farmers because the administrative tasks, such as “due diligence, traceability, and certification”, would burden farmers. The same requirement would definitely burden smallholders, indigenous peoples, and local communities in producer countries outside the EU.

Through EUDR, EU aspires to a global environmental leadership role in addressing ecological and social concerns associated with trade-driven tropical deforestation and forest degradation.

In the EU, products containing the label ‘palm oil free’ are common. When this label is attached to the product, it suggests the product would be ‘sustainable, environment-friendly and respect labour’. Consequently, without the label, palm oil in a product indicates something is wrong with palm oil – although the discussion between good and bad palm oil is still controversial and debatable, depending on perspectives.

Yet such a label actually only raises awareness, it is up to the consumers whether they want to buy the products or not. Therefore, while the label is acceptable in Europe, it is not in Indonesia. As the story in the beginning of this article showed, the label can trigger chaos and lead to the banning of certain products.

Palm oil is used in many daily-life products, like chocolate, biscuits, bread, cosmetics, cooking oil and furniture.  Moreover, the palm oil crop is cheap and efficient, with “one hectare of well-managed plantation estate land can produce up to 10 times more oil than other oilseed alternatives”.

Attacks and counters towards palm oil

Apart from ‘palm oil free’ label that is common in Europe, negative campaigns attacking palm oil products continue in Europe. Palm oil is considered the most controversial option for cooking oil in terms of health and environmental reasons. According to reports palm oil contains high-saturated fats but there are also many health benefits: it prevents vitamin D deficiency in many middle-income countries and protects cognitive and cardio health. Combined with the allegations of deforestation of the rainforest and risking the loss of endangered species, many producers then marked their products with the “palm-oil free” label.

Apart from having a dialogue with the policymakers in the EU on environment protection, Indonesia also tried to counter, or limit the general negative campaigning against palm oil related to health and environmental issues. Indonesia published a book The Myths and Facts of Indonesia’s Palm Oil Industry (the latest edition was in 2023) prepared by the Palm Oil Agribusiness Strategic Policy Institute.

Palm oil is considered the most controversial option for cooking oil in terms of health and environmental reasons.

The content countered the argument of climate impacts – such as biodiversity loss and deforestation – on health, and social impacts – such as corruption, land-grabbing, and forced or child labor. The book is used by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its embassies to tackle negative campaigns against oil palm, notably in Europe. This book is available only in English, used mainly by diplomats and clearly intended for international readers. According to our interviewed source, not many academics nor community organizations in Indonesia knew about its existence.

Another counter effort was to advertise public services the palm oil company provides for the remote areas, such as providing public transports, schools, health centers and daycare facilities.

Perspectives from Indonesia

Although EUDR also affects coffee and cocoa, Indonesia thinks that the EU’s regulation is “moral finger-wagging” specifically for its palm oil products. According to Indonesian resources (around 30 stakeholders being interviewed from government, media, non-government organizations both local and international agencies, associations, and academicians), the EU’s pressure started in 2016 with the RED II policy or Renewable Energy Directive 2018. Later, with the EUDR, Indonesia assumed that the EU tried to protect its local farmers cultivating soybean, rapeseed, flowers, and olive oil from the import of palm oil, and called it protectionism.

Interviews revealed that EUDR has become another tool to regulate palm oil due to its potential in biodiesel production, which is important for sustainable energy transition while maintaining energy security. Dialogues and negotiations between the EU and Indonesia (and Malaysia) have been ongoing through diplomacy and Joint Task Force on EUDR since May 2023. Planning to work closely on efforts on deforestation in the third meeting in October 2024, EU Commission proposed to postpone the EUDR application by one year to the end of 2025.

As our research on good and bad palm oil started, we came to Indonesia during summer of 2024 and heard the perspectives of many stakeholders. We met people from different institutions: government, companies, NGO’s, media, associations including certification-organization like RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) and ISPO (Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil), academicians, and even international agencies whose work is related to palm oil.

These stakeholders in the palm oil industry interact with various others, for example, one agency represents many interests, such as farmers and members of the association or a government worker, but also owning a small oil palm plantation. Thus each stakeholder has different interests regarding the commodity’s impacts.

Palm oil industry in Indonesia has been organized by at least 30 ministries, including local government institutions, with different aspects and scopes to regulate.

Their narratives show different power dynamics and negotiations to pursue their interests. Yet, government policies, their implementation, and supervision remain weak in areas of “deforestation, biodiversity loss, forest fires and air pollution, carbon emissions, water abstraction, including in land conflicts and Indigenous rights” –issues that are environmentally important. When it comes to sustainability, palm oil is a complex issue hindered by problems of forest opening, land certification, greedy companies, and corrupted elites. The players are also numerous and diverse from the national to the local levels.

Palm oil industry in Indonesia has been organized by at least 30 ministries, including local government institutions, with different aspects and scopes to regulate. The obvious ones would be the Ministry of Environment and Forestry with the Ministry of Agriculture. The interviews also revealed that even the Ministry of Religion was involved in handling this issue. This is a portrayal of palm oil industry magnitude in Indonesia, also for those not directly relevant to palm oil.

Yet all these stakeholders, including critical NGOs, have acknowledged the importance of palm oil for Indonesia. They just hoped the government would regulate fairly without being reckless in managing palm oil. Therefore, instead of acting as “moral finger-wagger”, it is expected that the EU could help an exporter country like Indonesia to pursue palm oil sustainability, both economically and environmentally, especially for the wider public impacted directly by palm oil. 

Through the lens of sustainability  

Both EU and Indonesia use the term ‘sustainability’ to defend their standpoint. This means ‘environmental sustainability’ for the EU and ‘economic sustainability’ for Indonesia (and Malaysia). Thus from the standpoint of the latter, EU regulations were always seen as discriminatory. A study in Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies back in 2022 stated that “both the EU and Indonesia are concerned about sustainability; however, [yet] have different perspectives and parameters to ensure environmental standards are upheld”.

EU has claimed the expansion of palm oil plantations in Indonesia has resulted in deforestation and peatland degradation. Yet, most interviewees from the government side worried that when upholding environmental issues, “people cannot afford to eat”.

The Indonesian case for sustainability still revolves around reducing poverty, leaving no one behind, and protecting smallholders, even when opening two percent of the abundant forests in Papua land for palm oil plantation. In line with the NGOs wishes, when opening palm oil plantations in Papua, the government must be able to tackle food insecurity in Papua, as well as malnutrition due to food imported from outside the region.

With different views on labeling, managing sustainability and certification, it is obvious that governing palm oil is not easy. The exporting countries, such as Indonesia, and the recipient and regulator institution, such as the EU, need to sit down together to negotiate agreeable solutions.

Indonesia is also determined to have its own sustainable palm oil certification, compared to RSPO. The Indonesian Sustainability Palm Oil (ISPO) was established by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2015 and it later expanded through the Presidential Regulation in 2020. However, the ISPO regulation was likely imposed more for upholding national sovereignty against the RSPO.  

ISPO developed by Indonesia, is – despite its compulsory nature –  limited with authority and enforcement when working for sustainable palm oil, in tackling “deforestation, biodiversity loss, greenhouse gas emissions, and social conflicts between big plantations and local communities”. It required many submitted documents and it emphasized sanctions over prevention, and guidance and sustainability actions for farmers and companies. The global market, including EU, has not acknowledged ISPO’s sustainability standards yet.

With different views on labeling, managing sustainability and certification, it is obvious that governing palm oil is not easy. The exporting countries, such as Indonesia, and the recipient and regulator institution, such as the EU, need to sit down together to negotiate agreeable solutions. Although the commitment to protecting the environment and tackling the climate crisis are important, the EUDR should be proportioned to address the multilateral agreement from the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities as the UN Climate Change Convention recommended.

Responsibility towards the environment (and tackling climate crisis) is different between low and middle-income countries such as Indonesia and high-income countries such as in the EU. Palm oil has a potential for energy security in the future, and both the EU and Indonesia must work together to achieve sustainability aspects of palm oil, both environmentally and economically.

Ratih D. Adiputri is a postdoc researcher at the Department Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, working on the project Good and bad palm oil funded by the Kone Foundation (no. 202205436).

Article image: Ratih Adiputri

Julkaisu Governing the Palm Oil Complexity ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

After holding the presidency of Group of Twenty (G20) in 2022, Indonesia now holds the ASEAN chairmanship in 2023. ASEAN is an acronym meaning the Association of South East Asian Nations,  a regional organization of ten countries situated in Southeast Asian region. The Indonesian President Joko Widodo, known colloquially as Jokowi, said in his speech during the closing ceremony of ASEAN Summit 2022 (minutes 19:45-20:15), that “the ASEAN must  become a robust, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth…[in which] ASEAN capacity must also be strengthened to respond to the challenges of the next twenty years”.

This is when ASEAN collective action is needed, especially in tackling the effects of climate change is one of Southeast Asia’s most vulnerable region. Even the Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, is reported to be sinking with already 40% of the city below sea level. Jakarta floods constantly, and seawall protections are expensive.

Climate action is seriously needed, and one idea is planting mangroves to save the coastal areas, like those around Jakarta. These measures have remained mostly ceremonial – introduced with highly publicity, as happened at the G20 event, but with little practical significance as mangrove destruction and deforestation continues to happen throughout the country, from Sumatra to Sulawesi, usually due to lack of citizen awareness, lack of knowledge of mangrove importance and ownership of public mangrove.

With these practical problems at home, what does Indonesia plan to bring into the forefront as ASEAN chair in 2023 and what does it say about ASEAN multilateralism?

ASEAN and its Community Vision 2025 

Indonesia is one of the five founding nations of ASEAN, alongside Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Now, almost every country in Southeast Asia, except the newest, East Timor, is a member of ASEAN. Established on 8 August 1967, ASEAN is a low profile regional organization and has a limited role in shaping the political and security environment, by promoting of regional peace and stability through historically informal deliberation style of the golf course. The ASEAN secretariat is also located in Jakarta.

After fifty five years (1967–2022), ASEAN’s position is still central in Asia Pacific regionalism. It has a pluralistic membership and promotes cooperation between its members, but its values, notably its “fundamental principle of non-intervention” and consensus resulted in weak institutional structure. Another observer also pointed to major weaknesses of ASEAN in “prioritizing national rather than regional interests first, weak leadership, ineffective bureaucratic structure and uses Western capitalist approach”.

ASEAN members are proud of ASEAN as it is, despite its weaknesses, arguing that perhaps these are in fact its strengths.

Many critics have further emphasized ASEAN’s ineffectiveness, always comparing it to the European Union/EU to advocate for a more defined common identity or regional integration. However, ASEAN as an institution has never been interested in becoming a Southeast Asian version of the EU, although the EU’s effectiveness has had certain appeal.

ASEAN members are proud of ASEAN as it is, despite its weaknesses, arguing that perhaps these are in fact its strengths. ASEAN’s neutrality is also considered valuable initiatives to improve “regional multilateral security dialogue”, for example, ASEAN had tried to solve the South China Sea dispute although unsuccessfully at the face of the great powers in the region, namely the United States and China. Indeed the problems is the region has become even more polarised great powers rivalry.

It seems like ASEAN member states are mostly satisfied with simply belonging to a loose, larger community which rotates its leadership among itself. Thus, despite its many critics, one could argue that as an institution serving its members, the ASEAN thrives.

ASEAN as “men in suits” 

Research on media coverage in Southeast Asia has also shown that ASEAN activities are defined by meeting of “men in suits”: the agenda lacks human interest and prioritizes economics interests instead. Therefore, it is not surprising that participation in high-profile meetings, global events or organizations, which emphasize economics, is also reflected in the policy documents and ministerial publications regarding ASEAN.

I have also confirmed this in my own research on Indonesian bureaucrats closely associated with ASEAN activities: meeting participation indeed showed as “men in suits” pictures in the media, although now some women were also seen. Economic issues were also prominently visible in the negotiations, showing that meetings were more like moments of bargaining, weighing financial benefit and costs of all tasks and investments.

The 2023 ASEAN under Indonesian chairmanship has not been an exception: the economy has been once more emphasized as the central focus: an epicentrum of (economic) growth, building “ASEAN that is resilient, secure, and responsive to its citizens”.

Indeed, ASEAN has adopted a vision embodying great ambition for transforming the regional economy by 2025 into a highly integrated and cohesive economy with four main characteristics. First, the ASEAN vision calls for a single market and production base. Second, it calls for a highly competitive economic region. Third, it calls for equitable economic development, which means development based equity and growth inclusivity. Finally, fourth, it calls for full integration into the global economy with all the Member States collectively identified as ASEAN.

At best, sustainability is used as camouflage for economic development. For example, documents on “green energy” can still involve coal and fossil fuel companies.

Such a multifaceted vision is unlikely to be fulfilled, or if the economic plan is aimed toward industrialization, only big industrial countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are likely to follow. The least developed state members (or LDCs), such as Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar and Timor-Leste are likely not included in such economic discussions. Consequently, human rights issues in Myanmar or Timor Leste are likely to have less priority.

Important transnational issues in ASEAN, such as gender equality, human rights and environmental protection and combatting climate change are also less important, as seen that these topics are “buried” under the ASEAN’s  socio-cultural community pillar with little to no practical implementation planned. In fact, the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) implementation strategy remains committed to business as usual. At best, sustainability is used as camouflage for economic development. For example, documents on “green energy” can still involve coal and fossil fuel companies.

The lack of development with a human face seems tragic, especially if we consider how the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, enacted in 2015, envisioned “an integrated, peaceful and stable community….to realise a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN Community”. Point number 15 was to realize “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” but ASEAN member states are too diverse in geographical size, economic power, social and cultural variance to realize this. Thus, as usual, very aspirational taglines along the lines of “ASEAN a community of opportunities for all” remain exactly that – aspirational, or forever “work in progress”.

This is only one example of many ASEAN statements on community and people, that vowed to have great vision and mission, but with limited interaction with the public at large. In short, aside from the economic goals, it seems unclear how well this and previous ASEAN community visions or roadmaps have been realized, if indeed at all. Furthermore, these commitments were unknown and remained insignificant to the greater population. This disconnect emphasizes the earlier point of ASEAN being defined as a forum for “men in suits”, with a lot of bureaucratic work being done, but only the economic dimension of it given any serious thought.

Environment vocabularies with ASEAN economic logic 

While the elites are busy drafting documents including “climate action”, “zero emission” and “biodiversity loss” at ASEAN, citizens at large, notably farmers and fisheries in Indonesia, are worried about day-to-day issues, such as how the dry season limits their access to water irrigation; how to plant crops in uncertain rainy seasons, or how to purify river water now polluted due to mining waste.

Solutions, when presented, seem technocratic. Mangroves are still removed, and local bureucrats react to flooding by constructing barriers or seawalls. While much could be accomplished by simply leaving the mangroves alone as flood measures, instead the emphasis is on building, because that engages the economy.

Tackling climate crisis impacts, such as flooding, drought and land-slides, are still not seen as actual sustainability issues, but as technocratic management of natural disasters.

With Indonesia and ASEAN logic on economics, climate change issues are seen as new opportunities for new investment, financing and business. The government focuses more on having roadmaps and written plans or reports on the circular economy, which emphasizes an economic model involving all products and materials to be reused, remanufactured, recycled and recovered (p. 12), than actually implementing it.

A sincerely drafted circular economy roadmap would be important, because it would also include environmental concerns and real longer-term sustainability issues, which also impact the general public. Tackling climate crisis impacts, such as flooding, drought and land-slides, are still not seen as actual sustainability issues, but as technocratic management of natural disasters.

As such, expression of “sustainable (something)…” and “green (anything)…” can be found in the stated programs in many recent government publications, with little acknowledgment of the role of or impact to the public. Clearly, the parameters of needing to act are understood correctly, but the challenge is always in orchestrating mechanisms that become realized as actions.

The importance of remaining hopeful

What do these say about multilateralism from Southeast Asia, or ASEAN, notably from Indonesia? Many policymakers in Indonesia are still locked into “sectoral” issues, or ministerial silos. Action on climate crisis needs collaboration and partnership, and while these are encouraged and stated explicitly as goals, the implementation of collaboration is still hard to achieve. This is partially, if not mostly due to the hierarchical nature of Southeast Asian societies, where elites control policies and rarely listen, inequality is still rampant and national policy has centralized power that can overrule provincial or local policy levels.

No wonder climate change and sustainability issues still revolve around awareness, building trust and capacity building programs. Education is needed as is time for the society to embrace sustainable behaviour and culture. A lot of good ideas can move from the bottom-up, not only top-down.

Action on climate crisis needs collaboration and partnership, and while these are encouraged and stated explicitly as goals, the implementation of collaboration is still hard to achieve.

Of course, it is easier to say than to do, and indeed we should do more. Engaging with academic scholars on development studies, I have learned that above all else multilateralism must bring hope – also within development studies itself. When we have hope and actively advocate for hope, we can, in turn, hope to connect, to interact, to communicate with people. Only then, multilateralism discussions of any transnational challenges, whether climate change, human rights, peace and security, will be more meaningful and lead to realizable solutions. 

Aspirations are good and have their role in policy, but multilateral engagement can lead aspiration into positive action. Seeing that happen generates hope, and that has its own positive momentum.

Ratih D. Adiputri is a postdoc researcher at the Department of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä, working for the project on UN legitimacy and transnational challenges, funded by the Kone Foundation.

Photo credits: Ratih D. Adiputri
Featured image: ASEAN secretariat building in Jakarta

Julkaisu Multilateralism from Southeast Asia ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

In 2022, Indonesia holds the presidency of Group of Twenty (G20), which is an intergovernmental forum of 19 countries and the European Union. In this role, Indonesia has huge opportunities to shape guidelines for the world’s future. According to the G20’s own website, it represents “more than 80 percent of world GDP, 75 percent of international trade and 60 percent of world population”. 

As an Indonesian living in Finland, the G20 Presidency of Indonesia offers me new insights about the G20 itself. As a common world citizen, my understanding of G20 events has always revolved around world leaders gathering to discuss global issues that affected the world, such as climate change, global pandemic, or equal economic growth, and what efforts or collaborations between countries to tackle such global issues. 

The G20 summit is more or less similar to most other annual summits of, such as, the United Nations’s Climate Change Conference or the World Economic Forum: an elite event, involving prominent persons or world leaders in politics, business, culture, and so on.  

Indonesia will focus on 3 issues: inclusive health care, digital-based transformation, and transition to sustainable energy. They are all important issues to discuss, yet they are irrelevant, notably for the Indonesian public and for many citizens at the Global South. 

Being a middle-income country and holding the G20 presidency in 2022, Indonesia has a chance to promote issues that impacted global citizens, especially for low- and middle-income countries. Indonesia as an archipelagic country also faces an immediate risk of climate change and rising sea-level. Its capital Jakarta is predicted to sink under water by 2050. It is important to address this reality with the G20 leaders. 

The Indonesian President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, stated in his speech in the opening ceremony (starting at 57:30) on December 1^st 2021, that Indonesia will focus on 3 issues: inclusive health care, digital-based transformation, and transition to sustainable energy. They are all important issues to discuss, yet they are irrelevant, notably for the Indonesian public and for many citizens at the Global South. 

A missed opportunity? 

Indonesia’s focus on three priorities: Global Health Architecture, Sustainable Energy Transition, and Digital Transformation”, can also be seen as missed opportunities to deliberate on local Indonesian issues, and many real issues impacted many people in middle-income countries.

Yes, the global health issue is still relevant due to the Covid-19 pandemic situation, but Indonesia may push the agenda towards access to vaccinations in general—for all citizens—with the United Nations’ slogan ‘no one is safe, until everyone is’. 

Since Indonesia had developed its own local vaccines, the G20 opens an opportunity to ask for collaboration on further vaccine development through transferring knowledge from high-income countries to middle-income countries, on, for example, how to store the vaccine effectively and how to foster local medication drives.

It is publicly known that Indonesian citizens use imported vaccines, especially in relation to Covid-19, showing that the country does not appreciate its own products. Such issues, regarding health care and the availability of the Covid-19 vaccines for all, are not widely discussed in the G20 events. The health working group discussed other things, such as value-based health care and digital health and the official website consists of lists of events, not detailing the issues being discussed. 

Green energy is certainly needed for the future, but with high costs throughout the product cycles, it is again likely that only high-income citizens can afford such an energy transition.

With the other two priorities of sustainable energy transition and digital transformation, it is obvious that Indonesia is likely to cater to the issues proposed by the high-income countries. Green energy and digitalization are strong in Western countries, with recent discussions on the EU Green Deal and the USA Green New Deal, and Indonesian citizens are only seen as users or consumers of the products of digital and clean energy from high-income countries. Indonesia still relies heavily on fossil-fuel energy, and the digitalization process is not equal, either. 

It is worsened by many unsolved cases of personal data breaches, due to heavy usage and data-sharing in social media platforms. Infrastructure for technology is only available in big cities or only for high-income citizens, not yet for all, especially given how unequally infrastructure — digital and otherwise — is distributed within the country. If the digital economy only means the number of social media users, Indonesia is on the top, but with the inability of the government to tackle problems of literacy, personal data protection and lack of proper regulation, Indonesia won’t be effective to foster digitalization at this stage. 

Green energy is certainly needed for the future, but with high costs throughout the product cycles, it is again likely that only high-income citizens can afford such an energy transition. Due to the lack of technology and infrastructure, it is a challenge for middle-income countries to provide green energy for their citizens with the current situation, notably after the pandemic.  

Thus, priority issues are not compatible with the Indonesian—low and middle-income countries— concerns. Most its citizens are still struggling with basic health and education issues, affordable and clean water, food waste, and home-based economy, to name a few. These issues are still rampant in many middle-income countries, yet, these are not discussed in the G20 events.

Events for elites? 

I have been studying the activities of G20 Indonesia’s presidency from its social media feeds, thanks to a work colleague whom asked me to collaborate in proposing a policy brief abstract for ThinkTank20 Indonesia 2022. Previously, I had no idea that such a think tank community for offering “research-based policy recommendations to the G20 leaders” even existed.

Our work collaboration resulted in a Policy Brief for sustainable agriculture. Thus, from this experience, I learned that during a year of presidency and before the G20 Summit, many issues and activities have been discussed in many events, within the Ministerial Meetings, Working Groups, and Engagement Groups throughout the year. 

There are at least 10 engagement groups, non-government works stated to relate within the G20 framework relating to business, civil society, labour, science, think tanks, urban issues, women and the youth, the parliament, and audit institutions. There were still additional group meetings for religion, education and tourism. Since my work focuses on parliamentary issues, I was updated with details of the inner workings of both parliamentary and think tank engagement groups. 

My experience shows that the G20 events are mainly for political elites, rather for the general public, even in the host country.

In early January 2022, I was notified about the timeline for submitting a policy abstract with different themes and attended many online meetings before the Policy Brief Submission in July. Due to many participants, group representatives who submitted abstracts could present their submitted proposal, but the presentation was only allocated a maximum of two minutes. I learned from such meetings, that most presenters only cared about their own presentations and did not listen to others. I felt that our brief Policy Briefs, intended for policymakers, were likely not being read at all, which also affected the participants’ attitudes. 

Moreover, when I was invited as a keynote speaker to online events in Indonesia and shared my research on sustainability or sustainable development goals (SDG), usually most participants knew little to nothing about SDG nor about G20 events. The educated society and academic audiences seemed more familiar with the red banners of G20 Indonesia, although they, too, did not really seem to care about the discussed topics.

This shows that the G20 events are mainly for political elites, rather for the general public, even in the host country. Some events were even held outside Indonesia, in conjunction with Indonesian ministers travelling abroad. 

Events in parliament 

The Indonesian parliament, DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) hosted the engagement event for parliamentary issues in its own usual style, like a seminar, where everyone listened to keynotes’ speeches and representations relatively passively, instead of parliamentary members debating or deliberating on what was being discussed. An Indonesian member of parliament, Achmad Tohir boasted that Indonesia is holding a successful event when participants come from many countries, even more than just the G20 delegations, although the meeting only produced a concept note Joint Outcome which looks like a simple meeting summary. 

In the summary, the parliament states that it seeks “a strong will to make united efforts to address global challenges, including how to improve collaboration through the multilateral system for global recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic”, but it is unclear what this practically means. I fear that as usual, in Indonesia, after international events further commitment will be forgotten, never translated into legislation, or even internal parliament regulations. 

The event was organized by the parliamentary international cooperation body (BKSAP) of the Indonesian parliament whose activities revolve around global issues, and which usually promoted the values of SDG. At the G20 events, one of the priority issues has been gender equality and women empowerment, yet this body does not even practice such values on its own. The five leaders of this body are all men, ignoring the importance of gender equality that it promoted. Indeed, it was another example of the notorious “all-male-panel”, as I had to remind them, especially when discussing gender equality. 

In the summary, the parliament states that it seeks “a strong will to make united efforts to address global challenges, including how to improve collaboration through the multilateral system for global recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic”, but it is unclear what this practically means.

Indonesia has been known to run many successful international events, and yet the outcome of such events, notably on issues relevant for the low- and middle-income countries, even to its own citizens has been questionable —aside from the obvious boost in tourism. The events are mainly elite gatherings. 

The peak of G20 event will be the G20 Summit. It will be attended by leaders of G20 members and it is held in Bali on 15-16^th November 2022, instead of the capital Jakarta. Indonesian media reported that Indonesia plans to boost the return of tourism to Bali with the event. Promoting Bali and its tourism after the pandemic is important, and the organizer is even inviting non-member of G20, such as Ukraine, to attend. 

Notably, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin will still come to the event, despite the Ukrainian invasion and resulting sanctions from the United States and many Western countries. We can only hope that the preceding G20 events and their discussions and decisions will be brought to the table with the world leaders, so that collaboration in tackling global issues can be implemented. However, this seems unlikely. 

The strategic role of Indonesia 

Indonesia has a strategic role in bridging the issues discussed in the upcoming G20 summit under its presidency. However, 9 months have passed and its events have not reflected what the general public needs. It all seems sadly similar to the Agenda 2030 meetings on SDG, that have been discussed in multiple forums and meetings, even in parliamentary gathering, but at the end unfortunately detaches from daily issues.

The G20 provides significant platforms to shape a sustainable future for environmental protection, economic growth and human development. The question remains why Indonesia doesn’t use this platform to address local issues that concern the country itself. These could include, for example, technology and infrastructure for regions at risk being underwater, affordable renewal energy, or fisheries and aquaculture development. 

These issues are more significant and serve as Indonesian contributions as an archipelago state, and are vital for world food consumption. Another highly relevant topic could be waste or garbage issues. It is important for Indonesia and other middle-income countries to say no to the trash-dumping from Western countries, to ensure sustainable consumption. The discussed issues must really impact many people in practical terms, and this can be voiced by Indonesia. 

Indonesia needs to use its strategic role to raise the issues that impacted its own citizens first.

With the theme of “Recover Together, Recover Stronger”, president Jokowi and his ministers hoped that the “Indonesian Presidency at the G20 is not merely ceremonial, but move to real actions”. Yet, such real actions are not yet seen from the events held within the G20 Indonesian presidency. We only see many events of elites, without commitments, but still seeking solution and cooperation. It is all talk, but with little action.

Collaboration is needed to tackle global issues, and voices from low and middle-income countries, like Indonesia, must be heard. However, Indonesia needs to use its strategic role to raise the issues that impacted its own citizens first. Using domestic problems faced by the public to seek a global solution would make the G20 summit more meaningful to all. 

Ratih D. Adiputri is a university lecturer at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland.

Image source: IMF Photo/Alison Shelley/Flickr.

Julkaisu G20 and Indonesian Presidency ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.

On 28-30 September 2021, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat ‒ DPR ‒ were organizing the First Global Parliamentary Meeting on Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), entitled Turning the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic into opportunities for parliaments to achieve the SDG. The event was held online and recorded, and it can be accessed here.

Despite the high-profile international gathering, and the importance of the SDG topic, which was supposed to raise the visibility of the functions of the Indonesian parliament publicly, this event was not covered much in the Indonesian news. It has already been previously noted that the Indonesian parliament did not do much during the COVID-19 pandemic, sort of “detaching itself from the struggle of its own citizens”, while focusing more on “global diplomacy”, This low visibility was due also to the institution’s mode of operation which is based on the personal activities of each member of parliament, especially those who have backgrounds as artists, celebrities, or elites of political parties.

The work mechanism at the DPR is balkanized, meaning that the members of parliament are segregated and divided, only focusing on the issues of their own commissions, rather than the whole of general legislative issues in the DPR, or their constituents. It is worsened with the fact that there is no voting mechanism at the plenary session, emphasizing the role of consensus in reaching decision as put forth by the party chairs’ oligarchy.

Members of the Indonesian parliament are segregated and divided, only focusing on the issues of their own commissions, rather than the whole of general legislative issues in the House of representatives, or their constituents.

With this background, it is difficult to capture news from the parliament as the members of parliament work only on commissions, and not working in the name as one DPR institution, even when the discussed issue is important as the SDG topic.

Moreover, the SDG issues in Indonesia are not discussed much publicly. In the state institutions, only a few at the national level know of the SDG issue, like the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), and the DPR under the committee of Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation (BKSAP). Beyond that, the SDGs are known in some units at universities or international agencies, while the general public remains uninformed, particularly schools and teachers.

This is in contrast with Finland, for example, where most institutions, like schools, NGOs, private companies, and the government are all aware of the SDG commitment and integrate the indicators in simple ways in their work programs, curriculums, and daily activities. For example, children in kindergarten have learned to recycle and to plant seeds. When applying for funding, Finnish academics are required to include the SDG aspects in their applications, for example in the Academy of Finland.

SDGs and parliamentary diplomacy?

It should be noted however, that the Indonesian parliament has been quite active organizing international gatherings to address the SDG issue. Between 2017-2019, the Indonesian parliament, or the BKSAP unit, organized the World Parliamentary Forum on Sustainable Development for three consecutive years in Bali. But these events have proceeded as little more than pleasant gatherings for global parliaments to visit Bali, without a high impact on national legislation, or on the citizenry.

The results of these events can be found in various documents, the Bali Declaration 2017, the Bali Commitment 2018, and the Bali Roadmap 2019. These documents are only recommendations though and as such members of the Indonesian parliament did not debate or discuss specific clauses during the events.

The forums were structured like seminars, with keynote speakers followed by questions from the audience rather than an open debate forum between parliamentarians. The selection of speakers was decided by the BKSAP chair, instead of any open or even formal discussion within the BKSAP committee or the DPR institution.

The BKSAP referred to these activities – organizing forums and participating in international events — as parliamentary diplomacy, as it involved meeting the international parliaments. Indeed, if diplomacy is based on the numbers of those participating in these international gatherings and events, the Indonesian parliament succeeded.

To deliver actionable results, the First Global Parliamentary Meeting on Achieving the SDG should have been followed up with actions, such as legislation through government policies and work programs, rather than just fancy words.

However, knowing this interparliamentary cooperation does not entail discussing any real legislative proposals or budgets but does entail participating in many international events abroad, the committee lacks a connection to constituents. Then, what public or constituents’ issues should have been diplomatized in the global parliamentary meetings? If the issues discussed at the international level had been implemented into programs, working together with government partners, such as Bappenas, and disseminated to the public at large, or at least used to create awareness of the SDG to all members of parliament, it could have been much more effective.

In Indonesia, the issue of SDGs is discussed sporadically, and the burden is directed to individual actions, rather than to the government policies or to the members of parties of the Indonesian parliament.

To deliver actionable results, the First Global Parliamentary Meeting on Achieving the SDG should have been followed up with actions, such as legislation through government policies and work programs, rather than just fancy words.

Still, the efforts of the Indonesian parliament to bring the SDG issue to the attention of the IPU through an event, attended by parliamentarians from 55 countries – mostly from middle-income countries – must be appreciated. Organising the event opened opportunities for the Indonesian members of parliament to emphasize the importance of the SDG issue to all.

The event for a show?

The first Global Parliamentary Meeting was held coincidentally at the same time as the Youth4Climate meeting held in Milan. Youth4Climate was attended by around 400 young climate activists who developed a concrete proposal for the ministers attending the preparatory meeting (Pre-COP) and the actual meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26). One of the participants at Youth4Climate was the young climate activist Greta Thunberg who argued that the “so-called leaders have so far offered only words, but which have led to no action.”

Thunberg’s words would also apply to the parliamentary event organised by the IPU and with the Indonesian parliament. The remarks from various parliamentarians were full of fancy words, often just advertising the work of their governments!

In every subject, from tackling the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, to the SDG budget, the parliamentarians who had very limited time to speak — praised their respective governments but none reported on how their citizens have coped with the pandemic or climate issues.

As the people’s representatives the parliament should bring awareness of SDG to citizens, and at the same time, represent the activities of the constituents globally.

Governments have already had their own international forum to report and boast their activities. By comparison, it would be better to use such global fora to relay the voices of their citizens, to ensure that “no one is left behind”, as one motto of the SDG goes, and notably give voice to their minorities. As the people’s representatives the parliament should bring awareness of SDG to citizens, and at the same time, represent the activities of the constituents globally.

In the last session discussing actions for parliament to achieve the SDG, most parliamentarians also repeated the same role of parliaments for legislating, budgeting, and monitoring, without actually highlighting what it means for SDG-specific purposes.

It was quite disappointing to hear the remarks from the parliamentarians because all the relevant terminology being used – SDG achievement, collaboration, climate change is real, resilient recovery and so on – is not new and tends to keep being repeated without any real solutions or actions from parliaments being brought up. Hopefully, in the upcoming parliamentary event, there is an obligation to bring the cases or best practices from the parliamentarians’ constituents and voices from local people to the forefront. Parliaments work on behalf of the people, and so the people’s voices must be heard.

Ratih D. Adiputri is a university lecturer at Department Social Sciences and Philosophy (political science unit), University of Jyväskylä. Her research interest includes parliament, Southeast Asian democracy, education and sustainable development. Personal website: www.ratihadiputri.com

Julkaisu Sustainable development and parliamentary diplomacy ilmestyi ensimmäisenä Politiikasta.